[Senate Hearing 107-506]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 107-506
A LICENSE TO BREAK THE LAW? PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF DRIVER'S
LICENSES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
RESTRUCTURING, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 16, 2002
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
80-295 WASHINGTON : 2002
_____________________________________________________________________________
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COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky
Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel
Hannah S. Sistare, Minority Staff Director and Counsel
Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk
------
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING, AND THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois, Chairman
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey TED STEVENS, Alaska
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico
MARK DAYTON, Minnesota THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
Marianne Clifford Upton, Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Mark L. Keam, Counsel, Senator Durbin
Andrew Richardson, Minority Staff Director
Mason C. Alinger, Minority Professional Staff Member
Julie L. Vincent, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statement:
Page
Senator Durbin............................................... 1
WITNESSES
Tuesday, April 16, 2002
Theodore W. Wren, Victim of Idnetity Theft....................... 4
Mary Ann Viverette, Chief of Police, Gaithersburg, Maryland, on
behalf of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.... 7
richard J. Varn, Chief Information Officer, State of Iowa, on
behalf of the National Governors Associaiton................... 9
Hon. Barbara P. Allen, State Senator, Eighth District, State of
Kansas......................................................... 11
Betty L. Serian, Deputy Secretary for Safety Administration,
Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, on behalf of the
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators........... 13
Barry J. Goleman, Vice President, Public Sector, American
Management Systems, Inc........................................ 15
J. Bradley Jansen, Deputy Director, Center for Technology Policy,
Free Congress Foundation....................................... 17
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Allen, Hon. Barbara P.:
Testimony.................................................... 11
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 53
Goleman, Barry J.:
Testimony.................................................... 15
Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 66
Jansen, J. Bradley:
Testimony.................................................... 17
Prepared statement........................................... 80
Serian, Betty L.:
Testimony.................................................... 13
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Varn, Richard J.:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 35
Viverette, Mary Ann:
Testimony.................................................... 7
Prepared statement........................................... 29
Wren, Theodore, W.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Appendix
Chart submitted by Senator Durbin entitled ``Forged Documents
(Identity Cards, Record Books, Passports)'' with attached
photos......................................................... 85
Chart submitted by AAMVA entitled ``77% of Americans favor
Congressional legislation to modify the licensing process and
ID security''.................................................. 95
Food Marketing Institute, prepared statement..................... 96
Raul Yzaguirre, President and CEO, National Council of La Raza,
prepared statement............................................. 98
Michael J. Eastman, Director, Government Relations, LPA, Inc.,
prepared statement............................................. 112
Letter submitted by Mr. Jansen from Marc Rotenberg, Executive
Director and Mihir Kshirsagar, IPIOP Fellow, epic.org,
electronic privacy information center, with attachments........ 124
Article entitled ``IDs--Not That Easy, Questions About Nationwide
Identity Systems,'' Stephen T. Kent and Lynette I. Millett,
Editors, National Academy Press................................ 151
A LICENSE TO BREAK THE LAW?
PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF
DRIVER'S LICENSES
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TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2002
U.S. Senate,
Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring,
and the District of Columbia Subcommittee,
of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard J.
Durbin, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senator Durbin.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN
Senator Durbin. Good morning. This hearing will come to
order. Thank you all for being here. Today, the Senate
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management holds a
hearing entitled, ``A License to Break the Law? Protecting the
Integrity of Driver's Licenses and State IDs.''
On August 1, 2001, two men named Hani Hanjour and Khalid
Al-Mihdhar drove a van from New Jersey to the Virginia
Department of Motor Vehicles office located across the Potomac
River just a few miles from where we are sitting this morning.
In the parking lot of that DMV, they asked around until they
found someone willing to lie and to vouch for their Virginia
residency. They met Luis Martinez-Flores and Herbert
Villalobos, who, for a price, were willing to help. Hanjour and
Al-Mihdhar paid these strangers $50 each and received notarized
forms which claimed that the two transients were, in fact,
Virginia residents.
Using these fake documents, Hanjour and Al-Mihdhar walked
into the DMV, stood in line, like all of us would, had their
photos taken, and walked out with authentic State-issued
Virginia photo ID cards. The next day, on August 2, 2001,
Hanjour and Al-Mihdhar returned to the same Arlington DMV
office with two friends, Salem Al-Hazmi and Majed Moqed.
Hanjour and Al-Mihdhar helped Al-Hazmi and Moqed obtain
Virginia ID cards of their own by vouching that they lived
together in the State of Virginia. After all, why should the
clerk behind the DMV counter have any doubts? Hanjour and Al-
Mihdhar produced their Virginia IDs to prove their in-State
residence.
On the same day, Abdul Al-Omari and Ahmed Al-Ghamdi, who
were renting a room at a Maryland motel, contacted Kenys
Galicia, a Virginia legal secretary and notary public, through
a referral from Luis Martinez-Flores, the same person who was
hanging around the Arlington DMV the day before. Al Omari and
Al-Ghamdi paid Galicia to have her prepare false notarized
affidavits stating that the two men lived in Virginia. Using
these fake documents, the two went to a Virginia motor vehicles
office and received State-issued ID cards.
On the morning of September 11, 2001, Al-Mihdhar, Hanjour,
Al-Hazmi, and Moqed boarded American Airlines Flight 77 from
Washington Dulles Airport headed for Los Angeles. They all used
their Virginia ID cards to board the plane. The same morning,
Al-Omari used his Virginia ID card to board American Airlines
Flight 11 in Boston, bound for Los Angeles. At the same
airport, Al-Ghamdi used his ID card to board United Airlines
Flight 175, also bound for Los Angeles.
We all know what happened to those three flights and
another, United Airlines Flight 93, that never made it to their
intended destinations that day. Instead, the commercial jets
tragically became weapons of mass destruction at the hands of
these terrorists. These terrorists bought their way into our
shaky, unreliable, and dangerous system of government-issued
identification. With these phoney cards, doors opened across
America, including the doors of these doomed aircraft.
Since September 11, our Nation has been struggling to
understand how such heinous crimes could have occurred here in
America. As we reflect upon the events of the past few months,
we have come to realize that our system of democracy which
allows all of us to enjoy our freedom is vulnerable to abuse by
those who seek to destroy that freedom.
The terrorists mentioned above, along with their co-
conspirators, knew exactly how to take advantage of our open
and free society. In addition to Virginia, these terrorists
targeted Florida, a State that at the time did not require any
proof of residency from anyone. In fact, any tourist could walk
into a motor vehicle office, fill out a form on his own, and
receive a Florida license or ID card at that time. At least 13
of the 19 terrorists held driver's licenses or ID cards from
Florida. A few of the 19 held licenses or cards from more than
one State, including from California, Arizona, and Maryland,
while only one did not appear to hold any American ID.
Some received duplicate cards from the same State within
months of September. These foreign terrorists knew that a key
to their devious plans was to come to America and blend in with
everybody else until they were ready to take on their murderous
mission, and one way they blended in with the rest of America
was to obtain a driver's license or a State-issued ID card that
helped them present a cover of legitimacy.
They knew that the driver's license is the most widely-used
form of personal identification. Across America, law
enforcement agencies, retailers, financial institutions,
airlines, and employers acknowledge the presentation of a
person's driver's license as an acceptable and reliable method
of verifying a person's identity.
The driver's license is also a key that opens many doors.
Anyone who can produce a valid driver's license can access just
about anything. It can get you access to a motel room,
membership in a gym, airline tickets, flight lessons, and even
the purchase of weapons, all without anyone ever questioning
you about who you really are. If you can produce a driver's
license, we assume you are legal, you are legitimate, you are
for real.
The use of fake IDs is one of the oldest tricks in the book
for criminals. It is also one of the oldest traditions of
adolescence and a rite of passage for teenagers, to casually
use a borrowed or tampered ID to buy alcohol or tobacco
products or just to get into a nightclub. But after September
11, use of fake IDs is no longer just a teenage trick or merely
about drunk drivers, as serious as that is, trying to hide
their bad driving records using multiple licenses. It is about
our national security.
I want to show you a page from the al Qaeda terrorist
manual. I am sure you cannot read it from there, but this was
found in Manchester, England. Police officials during the
search of an al Qaeda member's home found this particular
document and Attorney General Ashcroft presented it to our
Senate Judiciary Committee last year. It is obvious that the
September 11 terrorists were well trained by al Qaeda. They
followed the instructions flawlessly. Here is an example of how
successful they were.
Each obtained the form of a photo ID, but it is not only
foreign terrorists who use fake IDs or IDs obtained through
fraudulent means. Seven years ago this week, Timothy McVeigh
used a fake ID to rent the Ryder truck that he drove into
Oklahoma City. As part of his plot to blow up the Federal
Building, McVeigh picked up a fake driver's license in the name
of ``Robert King.'' The card even listed a false birthday of
April 19 as some cruel inside joke. That is the day that
McVeigh executed his terrorist attack against fellow Americans,
which was planned to fall exactly 2 years after the Waco
incident of April 19, 1993.
Another example, fugitive James Charles Kopp was arrested
in France in March of last year after evading our law
enforcement officials for almost 3 years. Kopp was accused of
the October 1998 murder of abortion clinic doctor Barnett
Slepian, who was shot and killed as he stood in the kitchen of
his home in Amherst, New York. With help from other
antiabortion activists, Kopp used a variety of fake driver's
licenses and passports, changed aliases frequently, and moved
in and out of the country.
So as we look to defending America, it is critical that we
carefully examine how our States issue driver's licenses and ID
cards today and determine if it makes sense for every State to
continue to maintain its own unique policy and procedures for
the issuance process. For example, some States independently
verify the breeder documents, such as birth certificates and
passports provided by applicants, while others accept them at
face value. Some States ask the applicants' Social Security
numbers, others do not. Some States ask for proof of legal
status in the country, others do not. Some States take
fingerprints of the applicants, others do not.
We also need to examine how secure the cards are
themselves. For example, each of the 50 U.S. States and the
District of Columbia issues driver's licenses and ID cards that
vary widely in the level of security and resistance to
tampering, from States that incorporate high-tech biometric
identifiers to States that do not even require a photo on their
cards.
I recognize many States since September 11 are taking
proactive, sensible steps to tighten their DMV systems, but I
believe we need a nationwide effort to coordinate those
activities.
To help us understand the extent of the weaknesses and
loopholes that exist in our driver's license issuance process
and the usage of cards today, this Subcommittee has invited
seven individuals to discuss these problems and to offer
solutions. I am pleased to introduce the following witnesses
and look forward to their testimony.
I would like to welcome and introduce today's panel, Ted
Wern, an attorney with Kirkland and Ellis in Chicago, thank you
for being here; Mary Ann Viverette, Chief of Police of
Gaithersburg, Maryland, on behalf of the International
Association of Chiefs of Police; Richard Varn, Chief
Information Officer for the State of Iowa, who is here on
behalf of the National Governors Association; the Hon. Barbara
Allen, State Senator representing the Eighth District of
Kansas; Betty Serian, Deputy Secretary for Safety
Administration of the Pennsylvania Department of
Transportation, here on behalf of the American Association of
Motor Vehicle Administrators, who have been extremely helpful
in putting together this hearing; Barry Goleman, Vice President
of AMS State and Local Solutions; and Bradley Jansen, Deputy
Director of the Center for Technology Policy at the Free
Congress Foundation.
Thank you all for coming. We are looking forward to your
testimony. It is customary in this Subcommittee to swear in all
witnesses, so if you would please rise and raise your right
hand.
Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you,
God?
Mr. Wern. I do.
Chief Viverette. I do.
Mr. Varn. I do.
Ms. Allen. I do.
Ms. Serian. I do.
Mr. Goleman. I do.
Mr. Jansen. I do.
Senator Durbin. Let the record reflect that the witnesses
answered in the affirmative and will not be asked to leave.
[Laughter.]
That was a joke. I would ask that you limit your oral
statements to about 5 minutes. I know that is tough because
this is a complicated issue. I will remind you, your entire
statement will be entered into the record.
Mr. Wern, would you like to begin?
TESTIMONY OF THEODORE W. WERN,\1\ VICTIM OF IDENTITY THEFT
Mr. Wern. Thank you. First, I would like to thank you all
for the opportunity of coming here and just let you know how
truly honored I am to be a part of this process in any way.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Wern appears in the Appendix on
page 27.
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My name is Ted Wern. I am an attorney in Chicago, Illinois,
and 4 years ago, beginning in the spring of 1998, a person in
Columbus, Ohio, stole some of my mail, and in that mail were
documents containing three vital pieces of information, my
name, my Social Security number, and my date of birth. Using
that information as well as a fake identification card, that
person departed on a crime and spending spree that was
unimaginable to me at the time, and I still cannot quite put it
into perspective.
There are two categories of crimes that he committed.
First, financial crimes. He incurred up to $50,000 in bad debt
that I knew about. He had telephone accounts, cable bills, and
utility accounts. He was able to board airline flights using
tickets issued in my name, of course, purchased with credit
cards issued in my name. He was able to rent a U-Haul truck. He
was able to rent vehicles. He was able to enjoy all of the
financial freedoms that we all take for granted.
The second category of crimes were a bit more bold and
these involved traffic violations. This man would be stopped by
police--he apparently was not a very good driver. He was
stopped by police on four separate occasions and he told the
police that he was me, that he forgot his driver's license, and
on those four occasions, somehow, the violations went onto my
driving record. All along, I had no idea this was happening and
these arrest warrants were issued in my name and all along I am
just driving around in Ohio thinking that there are not any
problems.
One of those occasions was actually a DUI, and under the
same circumstances, he was able to convince the officers, by
giving all of this information that he had memorized so well
and claiming that he has lost his driver's license. In those
situations, we think that there was not an actual identity card
presented, but it is hard to really know.
The end result was that warrants were issued in my name. I
was forced to go to court and appear as Ted Wern under these
traffic violations and convince numerous judges that these were
not committed by me. Those were the difficulties in remedying
the traffic violations, but to be honest, what took more time
and much more expense was to remedy each one of the credit
accounts that this person created.
For every credit card, and there were many, probably into
the twenties, every credit card and every account, there was a
half-hour of telephone conversations, numerous letters,
notarizing of documents. There is a very elaborate process that
one has to go through to clear these from your name, and the
most difficult aspect is that you get better at clearing these
from your name after you keep doing it. But the better you get
and the quicker you clear your record, the more easy it is for
him to get more credit because you have now cleared your
record, your name is clear, and he can just spend more freely.
The same applies for the traffic violations. Once I cleared
the warrants, I had a clear record, so when he used my
information to a police officer, he did not get arrested for an
outstanding warrant in my name.
With all that said, despite those problems, the financial
effects, the inconveniences, the emotional effects of knowing
that there is someone out there living a much richer lifestyle
than you are living now on your name and on your credit. Aside
from all that, I really do consider myself one of the more
fortunate victims.
For example, I am an attorney. It is my job to write
forceful letters, to navigate corporate bureaucracies and to
follow up with people and it was much easier for me to do that.
It came natural to me. But there are quite a few people out
there who do not have those resources. In fact, I volunteer for
an organization out of San Diego, the Identity Theft Resource
Center. I help victims in Illinois deal with these problems and
I get a couple of E-mails a week from people--bright, educated
people who just have no idea how to start and complete the
process.
Yesterday, in an attempt to be a little more presentable
for this hearing, I decided to get a haircut and the
hairdresser happened to be a woman from El Salvador who just 3
months after she came to this country had her identity stolen.
At the time, her English was not very good and it took years
for her to clear her record.
So despite my problems and the heartache it caused, I was
certainly one of the more fortunate victims, especially given
that my perpetrator was caught. He is now in jail. He is off
the streets. Many people are not that fortunate. Most
perpetrators get to stay out there for a while because, as you
will hear today, it is a pretty difficult crime to catch. It
happens sometimes not even on paper.
So with all of that said, what I would like to emphasize
here is that this is an extremely difficult situation to remedy
after it has happened to you. It has taken years for me. I
would like to say that government and that law enforcement are
able to correct these problems really easily, but the reality
is, once it is committed, it is your burden as a victim to
clear these things up. You cannot ask a police officer or a
lawyer to go in and convince creditors that you are who you say
you are. That is something, as we all know when we make
telephone calls and prove that we hold a particular account or
whatever, it is something only you can do.
So what I would like to emphasize is that once this happens
to somebody, the process for clearing it up is extremely long
and extremely painful. So given the limited resources that we
have, the need that we have to deal with this so quickly in
light of the September 11 attacks, I think we are doing the
right thing to focus on the prevention end right now. I mean,
we will get to how to clear it up, how to create a system to
help people overcome this problem. Right now, as I look back on
my experience, I wish there was a more rigorous system that
would prevent somebody from getting that information, from
using it freely, from getting a fake identification card.
So I think at this point, we are doing the right thing. We
are focusing on prevention and I hope that this panel and this
system can do everything in its power to make this all stop.
So once again, thank you for the opportunity for coming
here and it is an honor.
Senator Durbin. Thank you. Nice haircut. [Laughter.]
Chief Viverette.
TESTIMONY OF MARY ANN VIVERETTE,\1\ CHIEF OF POLICE,
GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE
Chief Viverette. Good morning. I am pleased to be here
today on behalf of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police. As you may know, the IACP is the world's oldest and
largest organization of law enforcement executives. It was
founded in 1893 and with a current membership exceeding 19,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Chief Viverette appears in the
Appendix on page 29.
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At the outset, I would like to thank you for holding this
hearing today. From a law enforcement perspective, the
importance of ensuring the integrity of identification
documents cannot be overstated. Even prior to September 11, the
IACP had been concerned with the availability of false
identification documents and the ease in which false
information could be used to obtain valid State-issued driver's
licenses.
Law enforcement has seen that the ability of individuals to
misidentify themselves can have serious, often tragic,
repercussions in our communities. For example, teenagers often
seek to obtain false identification documents so that they can
purchase alcohol. As we all know, underage consumption of
alcohol often has fatal results. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration reports that in the United States,
drivers between the ages of 16 and 21 account for just 7
percent of all drivers in this Nation, yet are involved in 15
percent of all alcohol-related fatalities.
Additionally, individuals who have had their license
suspended or revoked in one State because of their failure to
operate a vehicle in a safe manner have all too often been able
to go to neighboring States and acquire a new license under
false pretenses. As a result, these unsafe drivers are back on
the roads of our communities. Law enforcement officers who may
encounter such individuals will rely on their license to
identify the driver's infraction history and will, therefore,
be unaware of the driver's actual status.
Off the roadways, the ease with which criminals can
fraudulently obtain a valid license or manufacture a
counterfeit one greatly facilitates their ability to commit
crimes involving identity theft and identity fraud. In
addition, each year, law enforcement officers expend thousands
of hours in efforts to properly identify criminal suspects who
have misidentified themselves to police.
However, as we all realize, the events of September 11
greatly increase our need to ensure that the integrity of the
driver's license issuance process is enhanced and that the
ability of law enforcement officers to detect fraudulent
licenses is improved. As the September 11 attacks demonstrated,
the local police and other public safety personnel will often
be the first responders to a terrorist attack. However, the
role of the State and local law enforcement agencies is not
limited to responding to these events. These agencies can and
must play a vital role in the investigation and prevention of
future attacks.
Across the United States, there are more than 16,000 State
and local law enforcement agencies. These agencies and the
700,000 officers they employ daily patrol the streets of our
cities and towns, and as a result, have an intimate knowledge
of the communities they serve and have developed close
relationships with the citizens they protect. These
relationships provide State and local law enforcement agencies
with the ability to effectively track down information related
to terrorists. Often, State and local agencies can accomplish
these tasks in a more effective and timely fashion than their
Federal counterparts, who may be unfamiliar with the community
and its citizens.
In addition, police officers on everyday patrol, making
traffic stops, answering calls for service, performing
community policing activities, and interacting with citizens
can, if properly trained in what to look for and what questions
to ask, be a tremendous source of intelligence for local,
State, and Federal homeland security forces.
However, in order to maximize the capabilities of State and
local law enforcement officers, it is vital that we improve the
accuracy and ensure the validity of what has become the de
facto means of identifying individuals in this country, their
driver's licenses. Law enforcement officials must be able to
act with certainty when dealing with citizens in our
communities. We need to be certain that they are who their
identification documents say they are and we need to be certain
that the documents themselves are not counterfeit.
The effort to improve the accuracy of driver's licenses is
so vital because of the simple fact that individuals with a
valid driver's license will have greater success in staying off
the radar screen of State and local law enforcement officials.
As subsequent investigations have shown, the ability of the
September 11 terrorists to obtain driver's licenses or State-
issued identification documents greatly facilitated their
operation within the United States.
For example, as we all know, on September 9, a trooper from
my home State of Maryland pulled over Ziad Zamir Jarrah, one of
the terrorists on Flight 93, which crashed south of Pittsburgh,
for speeding on Interstate 95 north of Baltimore. During this
traffic stop, Jarrah produced an apparently valid driver's
license from the State of Virginia, and as a result, the stop
proceeded in typical fashion. However, if Mr. Jarrah had been
unable to produce a license or if he had produced a license
that the trooper could have identified as fraudulent, then
further investigation would have been warranted and perhaps
future events would have taken a different course.
To address this crucial issue, the International
Association of Chiefs of Police believes that several steps
must be taken. First, certain minimum standards must be
established that will help to ensure that information used to
establish an individual's identity at the time they apply for
the driver's license is valid and accurate and consistent from
State to State.
Second, agreement should be reached among the States for
the inclusion of both a unique identifier, such as a
fingerprint, and anti-counterfeiting security devices in
driver's licenses.
Third, States should be encouraged to link databases so
that licensing agencies and law enforcement personnel in other
States will be able to access an individual's criminal and
motor vehicle traffic violation history in order to assist in
the identification of potential criminal suspects or problem
drivers.
Finally, the IACP believes that penalties for identity
theft and identity fraud should be increased.
In conclusion, I would like to state that the ability of
individuals to obtain inaccurate identification documents
either through fraud or forgery has been an area of vital
concern to law enforcement agencies throughout the Nation for a
number of years. Unfortunately, it took the events of September
11 to catapult this issue to the forefront of national debate.
It is the IACP's hope that action to remedy this critical
situation can be taken in a timely fashion. We look forward to
working with this Subcommittee, other Members of Congress, and
our colleagues around the Nation in this effort.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and I
would be happy to answer any questions.
Senator Durbin. Thank you for your testimony. I appreciate
it very much. Mr. Varn.
TESTIMONY OF RICHARD J. VARN,\1\ CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER,
STATE OF IOWA, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Varn. Thank you, Senator Durbin and fellow panelists,
interested guests. I would like to start by saying I am
representing both NASCIO, which is the National Association of
State Chief Information Officers, as well as NGA today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Varn with attachments appears in
the Appendix on page 35.
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I need to begin by saying that neither organization has an
official position directly on the subject of identity security
or enhancing the driver's licenses or the life document
systems. NGA does not see a need for Federal action at this
time. It believes it is a State issue and the States need
initially to have an opportunity to address it.
NASCIO and its members have a special interest in the
information technology issues surrounding identity security and
want and need to play a role in coordinating and an operational
role in the design, development, and implementation of IT
solutions and systems. That said, let me point out some of the
things I think do need to be done, some of which I personally
believe involved some Federal action. That is my own personal
opinion, though.
Identity security is a critical component, and I will offer
my own personal opinion separate from NGA or NASCIO's opinions.
Identity security is a critical component of ensuring
accuracy and preventing fraud in the granting of privileges and
benefits in many government programs and processes. Identity is
like a critical junction point in the wiring of government and
the information society. If a fault occurs and false positive
or false negative identifications are made, real harm, ranging
from financial crime, ruined reputations, exploitation of
vulnerable children and adults, and violent crime can result.
Without good identity security, the trustworthy and deserving
can be denied and the dishonest and undeserving rewarded.
A common point of confusion in the discussion around
identity is between the right to anonymity and the right to
privacy. Privacy laws and constitutional protections are
plentiful. Anonymity analogs are scarce. One reason for this is
for most of human history, we have not been anonymous. We have
lived in close-knit communities and people have known us since
birth. We have ridden on that assumption, that we knew each
other, and our credit systems and our business transaction
systems have depended on that for the last 50, 60, 70 years,
when, in fact, that system had fallen apart.
The other reason anonymity is not commonly allowed is that
it only works where behavior, status, age, or individually
granted rights and privileges are not at issue. You have a
right to be anonymous when you pay cash or maybe when you look
at public records, but not when you are seeking a license, or a
government benefit, writing a check, using credit, working with
children or in a secure area, or buying protection from risk.
The people that do the transactions need to know who you are.
Who they share that information with is a privacy matter. It is
not possible to be anonymous and get those rights and
privileges in most cases.
The identity system on which we depend for most of our
transactions is broken and is more likely to actually enable
identity theft and fraud rather than prevent it. Sound security
in the creation of authentication needs three parts: Something
you know, something you have, and something you are. We often
rely on one or two of these to establish identity and extend
privileges and benefits. As a result, facts such as we heard
earlier, such as Social Security number, address, and birthday,
mother's maiden name, which cannot be adequately protected as
secrets, are used to create identity.
It is not these facts or inability to keep them secret that
is the problem. It is that we rely on them alone to establish
identity. Moreover, we have grossly inadequate methods for
creating and determining validity of the documents that
comprise the ``something you have'' component. And finally, as
was pointed out, with the exception of photos, we have not yet
embraced a common and coordinated system of a biometric for
presenting something you are.
Our identity system is broken, therefore, because the parts
are broken. We lack adequate investment, infrastructure
standards, and process in coordination and information sharing
among the responsible government entities.
I would like to just point out what others have said by
pointing out that I get on planes--our driver's license system
is one of those parts that is broken--I get on planes with this
identity right here. It happens to look like a driver's
license, but it is my State ID card. I needed no more than
being an employee of the State of Iowa to board every plane I
have gotten on since September 11, an example of the problem we
have with the security of the driver's license system.
Cyber security, homeland security, electronic commerce,
compliance with many laws such as HIPAA and this whole issue of
identity security are related and need a coordinated solution.
However, that is not how these programs are being done or
addressed. We are headed towards years of rework, retrofit, and
the integration of stacks of ID cards and ID systems unless
coordination occurs now.
There is a crying need for this and this coordination could
take many forms. I have listed some of them for you in my
written testimony, such things as interstate compacts,
committees such as this looking at how the government spending
is taking place in the agencies and in the programs that you
have already authorized and making sure that it is coordinated
both inside the Federal Government and between and among levels
of government.
I want to mention one other program that we are doing in
Iowa that might be also part of the solution. It is a
relatively simple and cheap effort to ensure that, what we call
life documents are protected from illegal duplication or
misuse. We have simply digitized all 11 million birth records
from the State of Iowa since the 1890's. This system will allow
the creation of an index and a process to reference that single
electronic record as the real and unique record of a person's
birth and databases can reflect when that is used in other life
document issuing processes, and persons who are the subject of
that record can find out when their birth record is being used
to create identity.
Finally, I would like to point out a need for coordination
for some Federal activity concerning the legal entry of people
into our country. There is a hodge-podge of systems that need
to be coordinated into a single system which mirrors and is
integrated with these enhanced State and local life document
systems. The Federal Government needs to have a document that
shows the beginning, the duration, the course, and the end of a
legal entrant's life into our country, regardless of whether
they are just visiting or making America their new home.
The multiple Federal systems need to create a common
electronic shared equivalent of a birth and death record. That
common electronic record can be used by all levels of
government in the same fashion as a normal birth and death
record and would be the reference document for forms of
identity and extension of privileges and benefits. Such a
record for legal entrants could include a photo, biometric,
statement and documentation of their life facts, such as name,
date of birth, and so on. Even if different cards or processes
stem from this one record, we will enhance the interoperability
and efficiency of issuance systems and we will prevent fraud.
With that, I would conclude by saying that NASCIO, NGA, and
my department, the Information Technology Department of Iowa,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I will be
happy to answer questions.
Senator Durbin. Thanks very much, Mr. Varn. Senator Allen.
TESTIMONY OF HON. BARBARA P. ALLEN,\1\ STATE SENATOR, EIGHTH
DISTRICT, STATE OF KANSAS
Ms. Allen. Thank you, Senator Durbin. I appreciate the
invitation to testify today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Allen with an attachment appears
in the Appendix on page 53.
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I became interested in the issue of identity theft last
December and January when I personally became a victim of bank
fraud. I will not go into the details here today, but I can say
that it was a very time consuming and frustrating and scary
experience.
As I researched this issue in my own State of Kansas, I was
stunned to learn how easy it is to obtain fraudulent
identification which is government issued in the form of
driver's licenses and ID cards.
As we all know, reports of identity theft have increased
significantly and exponentially in the United States and, of
course, in my State of Kansas, in the last several years.
Today, I regret to say that Kansas is one of the easiest States
in the country in which to obtain false identification and to
steal someone's identity.
Kansas is one of only a few remaining States that will
provide any applicant an immediately-issued driver's license or
ID card with no requirement of a Social Security number or any
biometric information. We have no security measures in place to
protect Kansans to ensure that the person applying for a
driver's license or a non-driver's ID card really is that
person. A simple photograph yields an instant permanent piece
of government-issued identification.
Kansas currently requires a photograph, but no Social
Security number or fingerprint, to get a driver's license or an
ID card. The bill which I cosponsored at the beginning of the
2002 legislative session would amend State law so that all
applicants for driver's licenses or ID cards would be required
to submit their Social Security number and a biometric
identifier, the most common of which would be a thumbprint, to
obtain identification. Applicants would then receive a
temporary license or ID card, and only after verification of
the applicant's identity would a permanent piece of
identification be issued.
In addition, today in Kansas you can receive an ID card and
a driver's license concurrently and we would no longer allow
that to happen. That would be prohibited.
The District Attorney's Office in Johnson County, which is
part of the Kansas City metropolitan area and also near my
Senatorial district, reports that cases of identity theft
double every year. Identity theft in the City of Overland Park,
where I live, have increased 100 percent in each of the last 2
years. In my county alone, this crime causes over $1 million
annually in losses to retailers, credit card companies, and
banks. These losses are passed on to the consumer in the form
of higher costs for products and services.
Of course, the financial implications of identity theft are
substantial, but they pale in comparison to the damage that can
be done, including loss of life, when criminals steal our
identities and use them for evil purposes on a broader scale.
I have attached to my testimony today an article by
Governor Tom Ridge, Director of the Office of Homeland
Security, who is encouraging governors and other State
officials to take steps to improve the security and
authenticity of driver's licenses. Governor Ridge recently
urged governors attending a National Governors Association
meeting to draft model legislation setting standards for more
secure licensing procedures. By coming up with their own
procedures, Governor Ridge said the governors would avoid
having standards forced on them by Congress.
Driver's licenses are much more than a license to drive.
They allow us to open bank accounts, to cash checks, to write
merchants checks, and to step onto airplanes. They are the most
widely used and accepted domestic document to verify a person's
identity, but they are not reliable and they will not be
reliable until we strengthen the verification identity process
before a license is issued.
As Americans, we have two choices. We can leave the current
identification system as it is and risk the personal and
financial security of private citizens, the finances of the
business community, and the lives of fellow Americans, or we
can improve the system.
Going through this experience in my own State of trying to
get legislation passed which would strengthen the
identification system for licenses and ID cards, I found that
there are some who argue a personal identification system is,
in fact, an evasion of privacy or a limitation on personal
freedom, but only those who have something to hide will lose
from providing proof positive that they are who they say they
are. Identity cards, and that, in fact, is what driver's
licenses are today, should be as close to foolproof as
technology can make them to protect us.
S. 559 is not about invading Kansans' privacy. It is about
preserving Kansans' privacy and protecting Kansans' security.
Senator Durbin, you mentioned the nationwide effort to
coordinate activities and I want to comment about a question
you raised in our invitation letter, which was what should the
role of the Federal Government be in enhancing the reliability
and security of the driver's license system. Based on my own
experience in Kansas, I feel quite strongly that a national ID
card is not the answer. Perhaps the role of the Federal
Government should be two things. First of all, to set standards
for more secure licensing procedures, and second, to offer
financial incentives to States that take every step possible to
ensure that government-issued identification is authentic.
Personally, I would welcome incentives from the Federal
Government to help convince legislators in my State it is
critical we improve the security and authenticity of driver's
licenses in Kansas. Many of them still do not appreciate the
magnitude of this threat to our personal safety and financial
security.
I just wanted to comment in closing that this bill passed
the Kansas Senate in March on a vote of 25 to 15. It passed out
of the House Judiciary Committee and it is currently lingering
in the House of Representatives, but I am still hopeful that we
will get it passed this session. Thank you.
Senator Durbin. Thank you. Ms. Serian.
TESTIMONY OF BETTY L. SERIAN,\1\ DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR SAFETY
ADMINISTRATION, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ON
BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE
ADMINISTRATORS
Ms. Serian. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am Betty Serian,
Vice Chair of the American Association of Motor Vehicle
Administrators, AAMVA. I want to thank you for the opportunity
to speak this morning.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Serian appears in the Appendix on
page 58.
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AAMVA is a nonprofit association representing DMV
administrators and law enforcement officials throughout the
U.S. and Canada. And let me tell you about a few Americans.
Larry and Rita Beller, Edward and Alice Ramaeker spent
their golden years traveling across the country. They were
killed on a New Mexico highway by a repeat DUI offender. The
driver, holding eight prior convictions from different States,
was under the influence of alcohol and plowed head-on into the
retirees' car.
Emeke Moneme, an Ohio resident, had his wallet stolen at
the local gym. Within weeks of having his license disappear,
Emeke discovered an identity thief had opened 13 fraudulent
accounts in his name totaling $30,000 in bad credit debt. It
took him months to straighten out his life.
Sara Clark, a schoolteacher, was killed after her flight
was overtaken by terrorists and crashed into the Pentagon.
Terrorists boarded her flight using a fraudulently obtained
driver's license. Sara Clark shared this sad fate with more
than 3,000 other Americans on September 11.
Larry and Rita Beller, Edward and Alice Ramaeker shared a
list of DUI fatalities with more than 16,000 Americans every
single year. And Emeke Moneme shares identity theft with
hundreds of thousands of American victims.
A common thread to these tragedies? The driver's license.
The driver's license has become the most requested form of ID
in the United States and Canada. Financial institutions require
it to open an account. Retailers ask for it when you write a
check. And the airlines demand it of you before you board a
plane.
The United States has more than 200 different valid forms
of driver's licenses and ID cards in circulation. Each State
and D.C. has different practices for issuing licenses.
Individuals looking to undermine the system, whether it be a
terrorist, a drunk driver, or an identity thief, shop around
for licenses in those States that have become the weakest link.
In addition, the lack of standard security features on a
driver's license allows individuals to exploit this system.
This makes it difficult for law enforcement to verify the
validity of a license from another State, not to mention the
identity of the person who is holding that license. The
situation is worsened by the availability of counterfeit
driver's licenses and fraudulent documents, breeder documents,
over the net and in underground markets.
We already maintain driving records. However, the country
needs more effective tools to manage them. Problem drivers who
obtain multiple licenses spread their bad driving history from
State to State. They avoid detection, they avoid penalties,
they avoid punishment. We need a system, such as the proposed
Driver Record Information Verification System, to keep bad
drivers off the road and save the lives of those who
responsibly use the privilege to drive.
DMVs already exchange driver history on commercial drivers
through the 1986 federally mandated Commercial Driver License
Information System, also known as CDLIS, and within a 4-year
period, CDLIS kept 871,000 potentially dangerous commercial
drivers off the road.
The American public wants a more secure license and there
are five ways we believe that Congress can help. Support
minimum standards and requirements for each State that each
State must adopt when issuing a license. Help DMVs identify
fraudulent documents. Support an interstate network for
confirming a person's driving history. Impose stiffer penalties
on those committing fraudulent acts. And provide funding to
make this happen, funding so that States can help ensure a
safer America.
Based on a recent survey, the public expects you to help.
Eighty-three percent of the respondents use their driver's
licenses for purposes other than driving. Sixty-five percent
think it is too easy to obtain a fake license or ID card.
Seventy-seven percent of the respondents favor Congressional
action to modify the licensing process and ID security.
For years, AAMVA has worked to strengthen the driver
licensing process. Following September 11, Americans quickly
learned how easily terrorists obtain driver's licenses. What is
saddening is that it took this catastrophic event to heighten
America's awareness of the importance of secure ID credentials.
We want to ensure that every driver has one license and one
driving history and Congress can make that happen. When you can
verify identity, we are certainly one step closer to preventing
fraud, protecting privacy, and saving lives. Thank you very
much for the opportunity to testify.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Ms. Serian. Mr. Goleman.
TESTIMONY OF BARRY GOLEMAN,\1\ VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC SECTOR,
AMERICAN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, INC.
Mr. Goleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership
and the opportunity to be here today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Goleman with an attachment
appears in the Appendix on page 66.
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Senator Durbin, we at AMS believe that this Subcommittee is
on exactly the right track by holding this hearing and
advocating the development of a more secure driver's license.
We believe technology can advance identification security while
preserving our personal freedoms.
I work for American Management Systems of Fairfax,
Virginia, and I have been involved for nearly 30 years at the
State and Federal level in how licenses are issued and in the
information systems that support that process. I started as a
driver's license examiner in the State of California issuing
licenses. I ran a motor vehicle office and I worked to
implement the one standard Federal license program that we have
today, the commercial driver's license. Before I came to AMS, I
worked at AAMVA, where I built and operated the information
systems for the exchange of commercial driver information. And
I know from personal experience that the system can be
attacked.
When I was an examiner, I was presented with counterfeit
documents to obtain a license. I stopped people from stealing
identities for the purpose of cashing stolen checks. I was even
offered bribes of cash or sexual favors in exchange for issuing
driver's license. For the record, I refused those attempted
bribes. [Laughter.]
But unfortunately, not all employees do.
As has been described by others on the panel here today, we
have learned that in the aftermath of September 11 that
terrorists obtained multiple driver's licenses and ID documents
from State motor vehicle agencies with ease, some using
fraudulent documents or bribes.
Despite this security breach, there is encouraging news.
This is a problem we can fix. With technology that exists
today, we can stop the fraud and counterfeiting of State
licenses. A model for the kind of Federal and State cooperative
effort that is needed is a development of the licensing program
to meet the requirements of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety
Act.
In helping to develop the information systems for this
licensing program, I have seen firsthand how State and Federal
agencies can work together. With Federal funding made
available, State licensing experts can adopt and implement new
strict Federal standards. Do not let detractors tell you this
cannot be done.
Your leadership and that of the others on this
Subcommittee, however, is going to be necessary to make this
happen. It is imperative that we improve the integrity of the
driver's license to enable it to live up to its reputation as a
reliable personal identification document. The reality is that,
today, the license is the trusted de facto identification used
by Americans to prove their identity within our borders.
Retailers use them for cashing checks, banks for account
verification, and airports for access to secure areas.
Our newly revealed security vulnerabilities demonstrate how
important it is that the next generation of ID documents adhere
to standardized security features and use the highest level of
tamper-resistant technologies available. Biometrics, such as
fingerprints or facial recognition, for example, can complete a
positive one-to-one authentication of an individual to the
card. Smart cards will also make the driver's license into a
carrier of important data, including the biometric identifier
on the card itself.
Used without improved verification techniques, however,
these cards will be useless as secure, reliable forms of
identification. I urge you to consider new technologies to
ensure that people with counterfeit or false IDs will not be
able to obtain better, more secure licenses.
The first step is a thorough verification of the
individual's identity before he or she enters into the system.
To accomplish this, State examiners must have access to the
data that backs up the documents, such as birth records and
immigration data. Today's web services technologies can verify
information in multiple databases while protecting the personal
information from unintended disclosure.
At AMS, we are currently working with Federal and State
agencies in an effort to improve the basis for making
identification decisions. Without improved identity
verification, it is clear that we will not be able to achieve
our goal of a more trustworthy document.
I would also like to draw your attention to the importance
of preventing or deterring employee fraud. Just as I was
occasionally offered bribes, today's examiners have their
integrity challenged when criminals seek any path to obtain a
valid State license. To detect and deter fraud, licensing
administrators must rely on technology for internal auditing
and business intelligence tools. These are tools commonly used
today in the commercial world.
For example, States issue commercial licenses today
according to Federal standards and it takes about 45 minutes to
complete a required driving test. As a supervisor, I would be
concerned about an examiner who issued a commercial license in
only 10 minutes and I would want to investigate that
transaction, but I cannot do that unless I have the data.
The steps I have outlined are not only necessary, but
achievable with Federal, State, and private cooperation. With
your leadership, we can achieve success in improving our
identification systems and homeland security. I thank you and I
look forward to your questions.
Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Mr. Goleman. Mr.
Jansen.
TESTIMONY OF J. BRADLEY JANSEN,\1\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
TECHNOLOGY POLICY, FREE CONGRESS FOUNDATION
Mr. Jansen. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having us here. I
wanted to say that there are a lot of debates on this in the
public fora and I have met with some of the other people in
this room today. A lot of the other fora are more prone to
sound bites and do not necessarily advance a solution to the
debate and I congratulate you for bringing together a lot of
people who do offer positive solutions. All of the groups that
I know of here and from what I have heard from the other
testimony are all trying to reach actual solutions, and there
is not a simple one-size-fits-all approach that is going to fix
this and I look forward to working with many of the other
people here in the future.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Jansen appears in the Appendix on
page 80.
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The Free Congress Foundation works with Eagle Forum, the
Electronic Privacy Information Center, and the ACLU to head a
loose ad hoc coalition of groups that are opposed to a national
ID system. I would like to, with that in mind, indulge the
Chairman to include a letter that EPIC asked me to have
included in the record.\1\
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\1\ The letter submitted by Mr. Jansen for EPIC with an attachment
appears in the Appendix on page 124.
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Senator Durbin. Without objection.
Mr. Jansen. I would like to highlight some of our concerns
briefly and then go into some other comments. The coalition
that we are working with put a letter to President Bush on the
AAMVA proposal. We oppose Federal funding for that proposal for
a variety of reasons, the first of which is that a national ID
system would not prevent terrorism. An ID card is only as good
as the information that establishes the identity in the first
place and there are other solutions that need to be done.
A national ID would depend on a massive bureaucracy that
would limit our basic freedoms. There are problems there in
terms of just what the identification is. It is not just
necessarily an identification system, but it could easily
become a data collection system and there are broader and
complex issues that need to be addressed there which could also
contribute to identity fraud.
A national ID system would be expensive and it would direct
resources away from more effective counterterrorism measures.
There have been a lot of varying estimates on this proposal and
there are lots of other proposals that might be done. We do not
know what the costs and benefits of these are and we need not
rush into some kind of a solution for that.
Our organizations believe very strongly that a national ID
system would contribute to identity fraud and make it much more
difficult to remedy instances when victims have suffered
identity theft.
Americans have consistently rejected the idea of a national
ID and limited the uses of data collected by the government. In
the 1970's, both Presidents Nixon and Carter rejected the use
of Social Security numbers as a uniform identifier because of
privacy concerns. A national ID would be one-stop shopping for
perpetrators of identity theft, who usually use Social Security
numbers and birth certificates for false IDs.
Even with the biometric identifier, such as a fingerprint,
on a national ID, there is no guarantee that individuals will
not be identified or, more importantly, misidentified in error.
The accuracy of biometric technology varies, depending on the
type and implementation, and it would be more difficult to
remedy identity fraud when a thief has a national ID card with
your name on it but his biometric information.
As an example of some of the problems that might happen if
we were to standardize some of these issues, the letter that I
received from the Subcommittee here asking me to testify had my
name spelled differently in the two different times that it
mentioned my name. Again, I am sure there was no intent to
defraud or anything else, but transposition errors can happen.
Senator Durbin. It was a test. [Laughter.]
Mr. Jansen. A national ID could require all Americans to
carry an internal passport at all times. That would compromise
our privacy, limit our freedom, and expose us to unfair
discrimination based on national origin or religion. The
national driver's license right now is not used for many of
these purposes, but other speakers here are right that it is
used more broadly, and the more it is linked with other
purposes, the more it could be used and abused for other
purposes.
If it is linked with, for example, our educational
backgrounds, it will not be difficult to determine that I went
to a parochial grade school and Jesuit high school that began
with the word ``Saint'' and determine, therefore, that I am
Catholic. We need to be very careful what a national
identification system is that we are talking about and also how
it might be linked and used with data collection.
In addition to the concerns that we raised in this
coalition letter, the Federal Government already has a lot of
authority to address some of these concerns. Richard Clarke,
who is the chairman of the new Critical Infrastructure
Protection Board, was quoted in Wired magazine recently as
saying, ``On the government systems side, we already have a lot
of authority to use standards and enforce them. We have never
done that.''
What we need to do is for the Federal Government to focus
on systems that are directly affected by the Federal
Government. Another speaker here today made reference to a use
of a mailing that helped perpetuate identity fraud. The post
office has a national change of address system that needs to be
addressed for uses for identity fraud.
We also need to be concerned that standardizing these
procedures across the States would truncate the discovery
process during a period of great technological change. Some
States might adopt different types of biometric identification
or different types of systems, such as the one advocated by
Senator Allen, that might be a best system. Even if we adopt
what might be an overall best system now, there is no guarantee
that that system would always be the best system, and by
actually having different States adopting different standards,
we have a way of comparing and contrasting which systems work
and which ones do not and adopting the better systems more
broadly.
In conclusion, I would just like to applaud the
Subcommittee for taking an active role in such an important
question. The development of new technologies, including
biometrics, might be able to improve the quality of
identification systems, but their capability should not be
exaggerated. The focus of the Federal Government at this point
should be to address the inadequacies of their own systems,
such as the passport and INS systems, and again, I thank you
again for this opportunity.
Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Jansen.
Mr. Jansen, let me ask you, you have undoubtedly flown
since September 11 and have been asked to produce a photo ID at
an airport, is that correct?
Mr. Jansen. Yes.
Senator Durbin. Do you have problems with that? Do you
object to that?
Mr. Jansen. To producing ID or a driver's license to
getting on an airplane?
Senator Durbin. Right.
Mr. Jansen. No, not at all.
Senator Durbin. Why?
Mr. Jansen. I think that it is a good protection for
Americans and it is also a private commercial enterprise, and
if I choose not to do that, I do not have to, as opposed to a
government ID or a government-imposed system where citizens do
not have that choice.
Senator Durbin. You are getting way ahead of me here. The
airports, of course, now are under Federal jurisdiction and the
standards that are being used at those airports are subject to
Federal rule, and one of those standards which is ubiquitous is
the presentation of a photo ID. I think most people would
understand that that is the entry into the system, and as you
said, that is not an unreasonable request that you verify that
you are, in fact, Bradley Jansen with one ``s'' and that you
are the person who purchased the ticket. So if that standard of
proof is reasonable, what is wrong with making certain that it
is accurate?
Mr. Jansen. There is nothing wrong with making sure that
that system is accurate, and again, I applaud the Subcommittee
for addressing these in a much more constructive fora than we
have debated these in the past.
Having a photo ID does not necessarily require a specific
identification card. I have traveled using my passport as well
as my driver's license. For example, in the situation of the
terrorists, one of the terrorists used a passport that was
stolen, and when the initial list of alleged hijackers came
out, it included the name of someone who had had his passport
stolen, had reported it stolen, and the State Department itself
did not keep a record of passports that were stolen.
Shunting responsibility to the States on this, I think
would risk absolving the Federal Government for their
responsibility in maintaining the accuracy and identification
of the systems for which they should be responsible.
Senator Durbin. That is a good point, and let me assure you
that no matter what we say about driver's licenses and State
IDs or other forms of identification, it is not at the expense
of the Federal Government meeting its own obligation, whether
it is through the passports or whatever source of Federal ID is
used.
But I want to make it clear that this hearing is about
State-issued driver's licenses, not a national ID, that the
States will still have the authority to issue and revoke those
driver's licenses. There is nothing in legislation we are
considering that would take that authority away from the
States. What I am trying to explore here is ways to make
certain that on a national basis, we have an accurate, reliable
standard so that if I present an Illinois driver's license and
Senator Allen presents a Kansas driver's license at Reagan
National Airport, that they know going in that it is more
likely that they are accurate. That is all that we are seeking
to do here and it is not to establish a national ID, which
brings a whole range of other issues into this discussion.
Mr. Wern, let me start with you, if I might, in my
questions. Senator Allen has been a victim of identity theft
and so have I, about 2 years ago. I was lucky. I did not go
through what you did, but I got a phone call at my home in
Springfield, Illinois, one day. My wife was nearby and they
said, ``Well, Durbin, we finally caught up with you.'' And I
said, ``What are you talking about?''
They said, ``Did you think you could get by making charges
at Home Depot in Denver, Colorado, and not paying thousands of
dollars that you owe us?'' I said, ``I have never been to a
Home Depot in Denver, Colorado.'' ``Oh, yes, you have. Is this
your Social Security number?'' They gave it to me. ``And this
is your mother's name?'' ``Yes.'' ``Well, you had a Home Depot
credit card and these charges were made and you have ducked it
and we have finally caught you here in Springfield.''
In fact, someone had stolen my identity and it took me, I
think, about 2 months to finally go through the credit system
and clear it up. And to their credit, no pun intended, it
worked, and when it was all said and done, my record was
cleared.
You went through a much longer, more involved, and
obviously painful process, but ultimately, the person who did
this was apprehended, is that correct?
Mr. Wern. Yes.
Senator Durbin. How did that happen, do you know?
Mr. Wern. It was soon after he got a DUI from an Ohio State
patrolman and was able to give my information and basically
walk scot free from that. I think that the vigilance that they
took after that event, both the Mansfield Division of the Ohio
State Patrol and the local Mansfield Police Department, they
really focused their energies on catching this guy because he
basically crossed the line.
That is not to say that other law enforcement was resistant
to following up on these things. It is just hard to catch
somebody unless they really do something that bold and visible.
Most of the time, these things happen over the phone, they
happen on the Internet, and it is just hard to track a person
down.
Senator Durbin. A curious situation, though, that he would
be pulled over for a traffic offense, not have a driver's
license, and be able to talk his way out of it.
Mr. Wern. Yes.
Senator Durbin. That is what happened?
Mr. Wern. That is what happened.
Senator Durbin. Did you have the assistance of any State or
Federal agencies in this effort to clear up your identity
theft?
Mr. Wern. Aside from law enforcement, there were two
investigators working on the case. I contacted the FTC, which
has jurisdiction over identity theft cases. Now, at least from
a research perspective, they do gather data. I also contacted
the Secret Service and the post office, because a lot of what
he was doing would be considered mail fraud.
The agencies were responsive, but I ultimately came to the
decision that this is the kind of problem that I can better
deal with myself. Their response was, well, send us everything
you have. You send them everything you have and it is very hard
from their perspective, sitting in an office far away, to
really approach it from a granular level and talk to the
creditors and track the person down.
And also, there has to be thresholds. There are thousands
of these cases out there, and at the time when I contacted
those agencies, it was at the beginning stage and I do not
think that the numbers were quite high enough nor the incidents
serious enough. Those agencies have to prioritize their time.
But I think I probably could have looked to those agencies
more. I think, in retrospect, I probably could have benefited
more from their resources, but it became routine. I learned how
to deal with it and I tackled it, I guess, in my own way.
Senator Durbin. And as you said, as a lawyer, you know how
to write a forceful letter.
Mr. Wern. Yes.
Senator Durbin. Chief Viverette, have you worked the
Highway Patrol for the State of Maryland, or at least enforced
traffic?
Chief Viverette. Within my community, yes, sir.
Senator Durbin. And so when someone is pulled over and
presents a driver's license, which is the first thing that you
are asked for, what is normal in terms of verification at the
site of the stop or the arrest when it comes to that driver's
license?
Chief Viverette. Sir, it is normal for us to use that
document fair on its face unless we have a computer available
to us where we can check that documentation. It may be that the
computer is down and we have to believe that what we receive is
fair on its face and write the citation.
Senator Durbin. If the computer is working, what can you
learn?
Chief Viverette. Well, we can learn more about that
individual and ask additional questions. Sometimes we will ask
for a registration and we can compare the information. But it
is not unusual to find tickets in a stolen vehicle where
someone has provided false information. The car is stolen and
the tickets are left in the car as the culprit leaves the
vehicle behind.
Senator Durbin. But you have a computer system that links
you to the Maryland State Police, is that how it works?
Chief Viverette. That is correct, sir. Not all the cars
have computers, just the fortunate agencies that can afford
them. You can run them through communications, but sometimes
air traffic and a busy night precludes that, or the computer
may be down, or you just get very specific information that the
person is not suspended.
Senator Durbin. Ms. Serian, let us talk about the system
now. Assume that Chief Viverette has pulled someone over and
gone into the State computer system to get some more
information to see if that driver's license is valid. Does
that, for example, if she picks someone's license from the
State of Pennsylvania, does her Maryland system check with the
State of Pennsylvania at that point?
Ms. Serian. Yes. I believe there is a nationwide system
that can check on the driver's status of records through the
State police systems. Ideally, in police officers' cars in any
State, eventually, you should be able to pull up the photo so
that would tell you then if that really is the person or is
not. But once again, photos are not even commonplace on all
licenses and the technology has not--it is not available, I
guess I should say. It is advanced, but not available
everywhere.
So yes, there are communication links that can allow those
things to happen, and perhaps Mr. Wern's record would have been
flagged. But in this case, it probably was not. In the case
when it would be flagged, the local or State police officer
would know that this is a potential fraud issue here.
Senator Durbin. But the communication between States is
critical in the world of interstate commerce.
Ms. Serian. The communication between States is very
critical, especially, Senator, between DMVs and driver
licensing organizations. We right now have a critical
communication in terms of information for the commercial
drivers. The Commercial Driver Licensing Information System
provides not only a status, but also the driving histories that
can be transferred from State to State.
That is a very good system, and that is why the AAMVA
proposal also calls for a system that includes the Drivers
Record Information Verification System so that driving records
and the information that surrounds that driver or ID card
holder can be transferred from State to State. That will,
indeed, help local law enforcement officials.
Senator Durbin. Of course, some of the things that we are
in the process of putting into a piece of legislation include
trying to make certain that the issuance of the driver's
license in the first instance is valid, that the person does
prove their identity going in.
I was recently interviewed by one of the television
networks. They sent a reporter to the streets of Los Angeles
with $150. It took her 2 hours to come up with something that
looked like a driver's license, and those of us who walk
through airports know how closely those licenses are examined.
People look at them quickly and off they go. I think it would
be easy to counterfeit them under the current circumstances.
There has been talk here about a smart card, about more
information and transfer. The idea, I guess, is if you can
swipe a credit card and in a hurry determine whether or not
there is any credit to be issued, the same thing could be true
for driver's licenses in the future, is that correct?
Ms. Serian. Yes, it is. However, I would say that right
now, we need to really focus on improving the driver licensing
document as the product that needs improvement. What States may
wish to do in the future are taking a driver's license and
making it other things, including health care benefits, those
types of things. Many States are researching those
possibilities right now. But that really needs to be a State-
to-State decision.
What we have is a system that is broken and a product that
is not very reliable. So I would really encourage the
Subcommittee to stay focused on improving the driver's license.
For example, this is not a valid Pennsylvania driver's
license. I know it. It is a counterfeit. But it would be very
difficult, and it is very difficult for the 16,000 police
organizations throughout the country, or in California, as you
mentioned, to know if that is a valid license or not. That is
why minimum standards are an important thing to consider.
Senator Durbin. Let me ask you this, Mr. Varn, because I
thought you made some very important philosophical distinctions
about anonymity and when you surrender it in our society. In
the National Governors Association, how far along are you in
discussing this issue?
Mr. Varn. Not very far along, Senator. I would say the
governors are at the beginning of discussing this issue. The
technologists are a little further along. NASCIO has been
looking at this issue of identity security for some time and
you will find a number of efforts in different States to
improve identity security, but I would say the governors just
started to examine it.
Senator Durbin. In fairness, we are just starting to work
on this bill, so I am not being critical of your lack of
effort, but I think when we look at what has happened in the 7
months or so since September 11, we now realize this is going
to be the coin of the realm in America. You are going to have
to produce a photo ID, and the question is, is it reliable and
is it accurate?
Senator Allen, in the State of Kansas, you have gone
through this experience. What kind of political resistance have
you run into in terms of making your process a little more
accurate?
Ms. Allen. The issue has been the issue of loss of privacy
and loss of personal freedom, and I guess it just depends on
your perspective on the issue, but to me, we are protecting
privacy and protecting security and it is really those people
who have something to hide who do not want to verify their
identity. Those people who do not have anything to hide, I
think are happy to provide whatever means are necessary to
prove their identification.
Senator Durbin. I guess the privacy issue is the most
important part of this conversation. How far can or should
government go in asking questions? As Mr. Varn mentioned, when
you walk in and say, ``I want to drive a car in this State,''
you have basically said, ``I am part of your system now. What
are the standards you use in your system? Do I have to take a
test, have my photo taken, a thumbprint?'' Whatever it happens
to be, I have really voluntarily submitted myself to a system
that has been established in the State.
I want to make it clear for the record that what we are
trying to establish here in this legislation are the basic
minimum standards of identification. Each State can then decide
where they want to go in terms of additional information, and
that is something that will be debated in Kansas or Illinois or
Pennsylvania, as to what other information might be included in
that card. But when Chief Viverette and her officers with the
International Association of Chiefs of Police stop someone
across America, there ought to be some basic standards that
they can look to and say, we know that this is a valid
Pennsylvania driver's license and this one is not because there
are certain elements we are going to look for that are common
to each and every one of them.
I might also add, it is interesting, if you would go to the
City of Chicago on virtually any weekday morning, just south of
Wacker Drive, you will see hundreds of people standing on the
sidewalk outside of an office building. They are trying to get
into the Mexican consulate because the country of Mexico is now
issuing a card called a matricula and the matricula is a
national ID card in Mexico, and these Mexicans in the United
States are anxious to get it because with that card, they can
get into the financial system in our country. They can open
bank accounts and do other things.
The standard of proof for those cards is far beyond any
driver's license that I have seen in the United States. They
have to produce original copies and certified copies of birth
documents, a copy of a driver's license, for example, from
Mexico, local identification as well. It is a very high
standard which is being used.
And it is interesting that we are saying to people from
other countries in our Nation, you are held to this high
standard, but yet for those within our Nation, we do not seem
to establish the same standard of proof in terms of what we can
achieve.
Mr. Goleman, let me ask you about the technology. You have
talked about that for a second. How expensive is this? Where is
this going to take us in terms of what it will cost to make
these cards less easy to counterfeit?
Mr. Goleman. The card production itself, States probably
spend today in the neighborhood of about $1 per card to produce
the current type of driver's license. Actually, Ms. Serian can
probably tell you more accurately what she pays in
Pennsylvania. But I would estimate that card production costs
would probably go up substantially, up into the $2, $3, $4, $5
range in order to put much higher security features on the
licenses, or if you go to smart cards or imbed biometric
technology into the card itself. It is still not a high cost,
more similar to the costs that Europeans pay for identity
cards.
Senator Durbin. The range of $1 to $5, you think, is a
reasonable range for our conversation here in terms of current
cost versus additional expense to make them more reliable?
Mr. Goleman. Yes, I do. On a mass production basis, I think
that the costs would be that.
Senator Durbin. Senator Allen, did you want to comment on
that?
Ms. Allen. Well, I did. In our bill, we originally doubled
the fees for everything to cover the costs of implementation
and there was a lot of resistance to that. So what we ended up
doing was amending the bill and we just raised the photo fee by
$1, from $2 to $3, and we estimated that that would cover the
cost of implementing even the biometric piece. So it is really
not a big increase.
Senator Durbin. That takes that argument to a different
level.
Let me ask you about the other question, about the use of
databases by the States in issuance of driver's licenses.
Getting back to the point Mr. Jansen and others have made about
privacy here, can you tell me what you think the standard
should be, should there be any national standard, let us say,
about the use of the database of information beyond law
enforcement and verification of identification? Ms. Serian.
Ms. Serian. There absolutely should be, Senator. Motor
vehicle agencies right now are governed by some of the
strictest privacy standards anywhere, and that is the Driver
Privacy Protection Act. We take those very seriously. In fact,
many States have even more stringent privacy regulations and
laws than the DPPA requires. We take that very seriously and we
certainly follow that law.
I do believe that with any new proposal, we should probably
consider additional amendments or considerations to change the
Driver Privacy Protection Act in terms of strengthening it even
further. Even though we have very stringent privacy laws and
regulations and we take those very seriously and we treat that
as a great responsibility, I think there is still a need to
even consider stronger amendments to the Driver Privacy
Protection Act.
For an example, if I may----
Senator Durbin. Sure.
Ms. Serian. An example of taking your license right now and
not using it for verification procedures--this is a real
Pennsylvania license here--and using it in bars or nightclubs,
not just for verification of age, or in convenience stores for
verification to be able to buy tobacco, taking that information
that is on there and storing it, even though you might give it
up freely to go into that bar, or even though you might give it
up freely to go to the convenience store or stay in a hotel, I
think we need to consider greater uses in terms of more
stringent requirements so that it can only be used for
verification purposes and certainly not retaining the data.
Senator Durbin. Mr. Goleman, you also made a reference to
Federal standards when it came to commercial driver's licenses.
What are those standards that currently apply when the States
issue these commercial driver's licenses, the Federal
standards?
Mr. Goleman. There are several standards. There are
standards for the actual tests that the driver has to take. But
as far as the information system goes, the States issue the
licenses according to the Federal standards and the States
maintain that driving record, but once they issue that license,
they essentially register that driver into the Commercial
Drivers License Information System, which is merely an index of
the fact that this driver, Joe Smith, with this date of birth
and this driver's license number was issued a license in the
State of Illinois.
If that driver attempts to get a license in any other
State, the State is required to check first to see if he is
already registered in the system, and if he is, then that
record is pulled back into the new State for combining with his
existing record.
So the States retain the data in their own systems. It is a
very critical aspect of the system, that they retain ownership
of that data and are responsible for it. Yet there is a
centralized index that allows them to locate the record
wherever it is.
Senator Durbin. Good. Thank you very much.
I might say that we had a number of witnesses who wanted to
join us today from a variety of different groups, Mothers
Against Drunk Driving and others. Each group kind of came to
this from a little different angle, but they all started with
the same premise, that the misuse of driver's licenses had
caused terrible problems, and I think we have heard about quite
a bit of that today.
The identity theft question, which involves not just credit
but traffic offenses and, in fact, reputation of an individual,
which has to be reconstructed, and fortunately, Mr. Wern, you
were able to do that because of your own skills.
Chief Viverette has talked to us about the law enforcement
side of this. But for a driver's license issued to one of the
would-be terrorists and used on September 9 to avoid any
further investigation, people may be alive today who were
killed on September 11. It is a matter of that sort of gravity.
We have also heard and probably know from personal
experience these young people who use these driver's licenses
for alcohol and tobacco and to hide bad driving records.
The list goes on and on, and I think it really calls on us
to try to come up with a reasonable means of cooperating with
the State issuing agencies so that we can establish meaningful
standards so that people know that it is a serious process in
the issuance of State IDs and driver's licenses so that we can
verify that they are not defeating the system by forum shopping
in different States for the easiest place to find a driver's
license, so that we can also find out whether someone has a bad
driving record in one State and is trying to avoid that
knowledge in another.
It is a way to crack down on fake ID mills and to deter
internal fraud, and I think Chief Viverette made the point, and
others, as well, we need to stiffen the penalties. We need to
take this seriously. If we are going to go through what I
consider to be the acceptable hassle of producing photo IDs,
let us make certain that they are accurate from the start.
Thank you all very much for joining us. It was a good panel
and we will proceed in preparation of this legislation.
The Subcommittee meeting will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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