109th Congress Rept. 109-174\r\n HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES\r\n 1st Session Part 2\r\n\r\n======================================================================\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n \r\n USA PATRIOT AND TERRORISM PREVENTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005\r\n\r\n _______\r\n \r\n\r\n July 18, 2005.--Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the \r\n State of the Union and ordered to be printed\r\n\r\n _______\r\n \r\n\r\n Mr. Hoekstra, from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, \r\n submitted the following\r\n\r\n R E P O R T\r\n\r\n together with\r\n\r\n ADDITIONAL VIEWS\r\n\r\n [To accompany H.R. 3199]\r\n\r\n [Including cost estimate of the Congressional Budget Office]\r\n\r\n The Committee on Permanent Select Committee on \r\nIntelligence, to whom was referred the bill (H.R. 3199) to \r\nextend and modify authorities needed to combat terrorism, and \r\nfor other purposes, having considered the same, report \r\nfavorably thereon with an amendment and recommend that the bill \r\nas amended do pass.\r\n The amendment is as follows:\r\n Strike all after the enacting clause and insert the \r\nfollowing:\r\n\r\nSECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.\r\n\r\n This Act may be cited as the ``USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention \r\nReauthorization Act of 2005''.\r\n\r\nSEC. 2. REFERENCES TO USA PATRIOT ACT.\r\n\r\n A reference in this Act to the USA PATRIOT ACT shall be deemed a \r\nreference to the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing \r\nAppropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA \r\nPATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001.\r\n\r\nSEC. 3. REPEAL OF USA PATRIOT ACT SUNSET PROVISION.\r\n\r\n Section 224 of the USA PATRIOT ACT is repealed.\r\n\r\nSEC. 4. EXTENSION OF SUNSET PROVISION RELATING TO INDIVIDUAL TERRORISTS \r\n AS AGENTS OF FOREIGN POWERS.\r\n\r\n Subsection (b) of section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and \r\nTerrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3742) \r\nis amended to read as follows:\r\n ``(b) Sunset.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the amendment \r\nmade by subsection (a) shall cease to have effect on December 31, 2010.\r\n ``(2) With respect to any particular foreign intelligence \r\ninvestigation that began before the date on which the amendment made by \r\nsubsection (a) ceases to have effect, such amendment shall continue in \r\neffect.''\r\n\r\nSEC. 5. REPEAL OF SUNSET PROVISION RELATING TO SECTION 2332B AND THE \r\n MATERIAL SUPPORT SECTIONS OF TITLE 18, UNITED \r\n STATES CODE.\r\n\r\n Section 6603 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act \r\nof 2004 (Public Law 108-458; 118 Stat. 3762) is amended by striking \r\nsubsection (g).\r\n\r\nSEC. 6. SHARING OF ELECTRONIC, WIRE, AND ORAL INTERCEPTION INFORMATION \r\n UNDER SECTION 203(B) OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT.\r\n\r\n Section 2517(6) of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding \r\nat the end the following: ``Within a reasonable time after a disclosure \r\nof the contents of a communication under this subsection, an attorney \r\nfor the Government shall file, under seal, a notice with a judge whose \r\norder authorized or approved the interception of that communication, \r\nstating the fact that such contents were disclosed and the departments, \r\nagencies, or entities to which the disclosure was made.''.\r\n\r\nSEC. 7. DURATION OF FISA SURVEILLANCE OF NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS \r\n UNDER SECTION 207 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT.\r\n\r\n (a) Electronic Surveillance.--Section 105(e) of the Foreign \r\nIntelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805(e)) is amended--\r\n (1) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``, as defined in \r\n section 101(b)(1)(A)'' and inserting ``who is not a United \r\n States person''; and\r\n (2) in subsection (2)(B), by striking ``as defined in section \r\n 101(b)(1)(A)'' and inserting ``who is not a United States \r\n person''.\r\n (b) Physical Search.--Section 304(d) of such Act (50 U.S.C. 1824(d)) \r\nis amended--\r\n (1) in paragraph (1)(B), by striking ``as defined in section \r\n 101(b)(1)(A)'' and inserting ``who is not a United States \r\n person''; and\r\n (2) in paragraph (2), by striking ``as defined in section \r\n 101(b)(1)(A)'' and inserting ``who is not a United States \r\n person''.\r\n (c) Pen Registers, Trap and Trace Devices.--Section 402(e) of such \r\nAct (50 U.S.C. 1842(e)) is amended--\r\n (1) by striking ``(e) An'' and inserting ``(e)(1) Except as \r\n provided in paragraph (2), an''; and\r\n (2) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:\r\n ``(2) In the case of an application under subsection (c) where the \r\napplicant has certified that the information likely to be obtained is \r\nforeign intelligence information not concerning a United States person, \r\nan order, or an extension of an order, under this section may be for a \r\nperiod not to exceed one year.''.\r\n\r\nSEC. 8. ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS UNDER SECTION 501 OF FISA \r\n UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT.\r\n\r\n (a) Establishment of Relevance Standard.--Subsection (b)(2) of \r\nsection 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 \r\nU.S.C. 1861), is amended by striking ``to obtain'' and all that follows \r\nand inserting ``and that the information likely to be obtained from the \r\ntangible things is reasonably expected to be (A) foreign intelligence \r\ninformation not concerning a United States person, or (B) relevant to \r\nan ongoing investigation to protect against international terrorism or \r\nclandestine intelligence activities.''.\r\n (b) Clarification of Judicial Discretion.--Subsection (c)(1) of such \r\nsection is amended to read as follows:\r\n ``(c)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, if the \r\njudge finds that the application meets the requirements of subsections \r\n(a) and (b), the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or \r\nas modified, approving the release of records.''.\r\n (c) Authority to Disclose to Attorney.--Subsection (d) of such \r\nsection is amended to read as follows:\r\n ``(d)(1) No person shall disclose to any person (other than a \r\nqualified person) that the United States has sought or obtained \r\ntangible things under this section.\r\n ``(2) An order under this section shall notify the person to whom the \r\norder is directed of the nondisclosure requirement under paragraph (1).\r\n ``(3) Any person to whom an order is directed under this section who \r\ndiscloses that the United States has sought to obtain tangible things \r\nunder this section to a qualified person in response to the order shall \r\ninform such qualified person of the nondisclosure requirement under \r\nparagraph (1) and that such qualified person is also subject to such \r\nnondisclosure requirement.\r\n ``(4) A qualified person shall be subject to any nondisclosure \r\nrequirement applicable to a person to whom an order is directed under \r\nthis section in the same manner as such person.\r\n ``(5) In this subsection, the term `qualified person' means--\r\n ``(A) any person necessary to produce the tangible things \r\n pursuant to an order under this section; or\r\n ``(B) an attorney to obtain legal advice in response to an \r\n order under this section.''.\r\n (d) Judicial Review.--\r\n (1) Petition review panel.--Section 103 of the Foreign \r\n Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1803) is \r\n amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:\r\n ``(e)(1) Three judges designated under subsection (a) who reside \r\nwithin 20 miles of the District of Columbia, or if all of such judges \r\nare unavailable, other judges of the court established under subsection \r\n(a) as may be designated by the Presiding Judge of such court (who is \r\ndesignated by the Chief Justice of the United States from among the \r\njudges of the court), shall comprise a petition review panel which \r\nshall have jurisdiction to review petitions filed pursuant to section \r\n501(f)(1).\r\n ``(2) Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of the \r\nUSA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2005, the \r\ncourt established under subsection (a) shall develop and issue \r\nprocedures for the review of petitions filed pursuant to section \r\n501(f)(1) by the panel established under paragraph (1). Such procedures \r\nshall provide that review of a petition shall be conducted ex parte and \r\nin camera and shall also provide for the designation of an Acting \r\nPresiding Judge.''.\r\n (2) Proceedings.--Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence \r\n Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1861) is further amended by \r\n adding at the end the following new subsection:\r\n ``(f)(1) A person receiving an order to produce any tangible thing \r\nunder this section may challenge the legality of that order by filing a \r\npetition in the panel established by section 103(e)(1). The Presiding \r\nJudge shall conduct an initial review of the petition. If the Presiding \r\nJudge determines that the petition is frivolous, the Presiding Judge \r\nshall immediately deny the petition and promptly provide a written \r\nstatement of the reasons for the determination for the record. If the \r\nPresiding Judge determines that the petition is not frivolous, the \r\nPresiding Judge shall immediately assign the petition to one of the \r\njudges serving on such panel. The assigned judge shall promptly \r\nconsider the petition in accordance with procedures developed and \r\nissued pursuant to section 103(e)(2). The judge considering the \r\npetition may modify or set aside the order only if the judge finds that \r\nthe order does not meet the requirements of this section or is \r\notherwise unlawful. If the judge does not modify or set aside the \r\norder, the judge shall immediately affirm the order and order the \r\nrecipient to comply therewith. A petition for review of a decision to \r\naffirm, modify, or set aside an order by the United States or any \r\nperson receiving such order shall be to the court of review established \r\nunder section 103(b), which shall have jurisdiction to consider such \r\npetitions. The court of review shall immediately provide for the record \r\na written statement of the reasons for its decision and, on petition of \r\nthe United States or any person receiving such order for writ of \r\ncertiorari, the record shall be transmitted under seal to the Supreme \r\nCourt, which shall have jurisdiction to review such decision.\r\n ``(2) Judicial proceedings under this subsection shall be concluded \r\nas expeditiously as possible. The judge considering a petition filed \r\nunder this subsection shall provide for the record a written statement \r\nof the reasons for the decision. The record of proceedings, including \r\npetitions filed, orders granted, and statements of reasons for \r\ndecision, shall be maintained under security measures established by \r\nthe Chief Justice of the United States in consultation with the \r\nAttorney General and the Director of National Intelligence.\r\n ``(3) All petitions under this subsection shall be filed under seal, \r\nand the court, upon the government's request, shall review any \r\ngovernment submission, which may include classified information, as \r\nwell as the government's application and related materials, ex parte \r\nand in camera.''.\r\n\r\nSEC. 9. MODIFICATION OF SURVEILLANCE AUTHORITY UNDER THE FOREIGN \r\n INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978.\r\n\r\n Subsection (c)(2) of section 105 of the Foreign Intelligence \r\nSurveillance Act of 1978 (50 U.S.C. 1805) is amended--\r\n (1) by striking ``and'' at the end of subparagraph (C);\r\n (2) by striking the period at the end of subparagraph (D) and \r\n inserting ``;and''; and\r\n (3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:\r\n ``(E) that, in cases where the facility or place at which \r\nsurveillance will be directed is not known at the time the order is \r\nissued, the applicant shall notifiy a judge having jurisdiction under \r\nsection 103 within a reasonable period of time, as determined by the \r\ncourt, after surveillance begins to be directed at a new facility or \r\nplace, and that such notice shall contain a statement of the facts and \r\ncircumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify the belief that \r\nthe facility or place at which the electronic surveillance was directed \r\nis being used, or is about to be used, by the target of the electronic \r\nsurveillance.''.\r\n\r\n Purpose\r\n\r\n The purpose of H.R. 3199 is to extend and modify \r\nauthorities needed to combat terrorism and espionage provided \r\nin the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing \r\nAppropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism \r\n(``USA PATRIOT'') Act of 2001 and the Intelligence Reform and \r\nTerrorism Prevention Act of 2004.\r\n\r\n Committee Statement and Views\r\n\r\n\r\nA. Background and need for legislation\r\n\r\n Immediately after the terrorist attacks of September 11, \r\n2001, Congress and the Administration quickly determined that \r\nthe legal tools available to investigators to fight terrorists \r\nand spies were inadequate. The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 provided \r\ncritical additional tools to intelligence and law enforcement \r\nofficials in counterterrorism and counterespionage \r\ninvestigations, and implemented reforms to facilitate better \r\ninformation sharing between the intelligence and law \r\nenforcement communities.\r\n The authorities of the USA PATRIOT Act have been used \r\ncontinuously since its enactment to enhance the federal \r\ngovernment's capacity to gather and share intelligence. Many of \r\nthe results have been clear and demonstrable. For example, the \r\nNational Counterterorism Center receives and shares information \r\non a daily basis with law enforcement agencies, and has \r\nestimated that the number of known or appropriately suspected \r\nterrorists intercepted at borders of the United States, based \r\non FBI reporting alone, has increased due to the information \r\nsharing provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. In another example, \r\nthe Department of Justice has applied Section 214 of the Act to \r\ninternational terrorism and counterintelligence investigations, \r\nincluding a case where the subject was believed to be \r\nattempting to procure nuclear arms.\r\n Other successes of the USA PATRIOT Act have not been as \r\npublicly apparent but are equally, if not more, significant. \r\nThe Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence receives regular \r\nand detailed classified reporting with respect to the exercise \r\nof authorities under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act \r\n(``FISA''), including the enhancements provided under the USA \r\nPATRIOT Act. Although it cannot be discussed in an unclassified \r\nformat, this reporting clearly has established the vital role \r\nthat these enhanced authorities play on a daily basis in a wide \r\nvariety of critical counterintelligence and counterterrorism \r\ninvestigations.\r\n In considering reauthorization of the Act, the Committee \r\nhas endeavored to emphasize that many of the core enhanced \r\nauthorities of the USA PATRIOT Act are fundamentally \r\nintelligence authorities intended to gather information to \r\ncounter threats to national security from terrorists and spies. \r\nThe Act provides enhanced but carefully tailored authorities, \r\nusually targeted against ``foreign powers'' and ``agents of \r\nforeign powers.'' The PATRIOT Act also has definitively broken \r\ndown the ``wall'' between intelligence and law enforcement \r\nagencies to allow them to share information, free of artificial \r\nstovepipes.\r\n What the PATRIOT Act is not, either in intent or practice, \r\nis a license for the government to invade the privacy of \r\nordinary citizens or to violate civil liberties. The Department \r\nof Justice Inspector General reported earlier this year that it \r\nhad received 1,943 allegations of abuse of the PATRIOT Act. \r\nNone of those complaints were found to have even alleged \r\nmisconduct by Justice Department employees relating to use of a \r\nprovision in the PATRIOT Act, and only 12 warranted further \r\ninvestigation for civil liberties issues unrelated to the \r\nPATRIOT Act.\r\n Under Section 224 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the authorities \r\ncontained in sixteen of its provisions are scheduled to expire \r\non December 31, 2005. Ten of those provisions concern \r\nintelligence and intelligence-related matters within the \r\njurisdiction of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence:\r\n Section 203(b). Authority to Share Electronic, Oral, \r\n and Wire Interception Information\r\n Section 203(d). Foreign Intelligence Information\r\n Section 204. Clarification of Intelligence Exceptions \r\n From Limitations on Interception and Disclosure of \r\n Wire, Oral, and Electronic Communications\r\n Section 206. Roving Surveillance Authority Under FISA\r\n Section 207. Duration of FISA Surveillance of Non-\r\n United States Persons Who Are Agents of a Foreign Power\r\n Section 214. Pen Register and Trap and Trace \r\n Authority Under FISA\r\n Section 215. Access to Records and Other Items Under \r\n FISA\r\n Section 218. Foreign Intelligence Information\r\n Section 223. Civil Liability for Certain Unauthorized \r\n Disclosures (with respect to duties imposed on \r\n intelligence agencies)\r\n Section 225. Immunity for Compliance with FISA \r\n Wiretap\r\n In addition, the Committee has considered renewal of \r\nSection 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism \r\nPrevention Act of 2004, relating to individual terrorists as \r\nagents of foreign powers, which is also scheduled to expire on \r\nDecember 31, 2005.\r\n The record in support of reauthorizing these provisions is \r\nclear and convincing. The expiring provisions have been the \r\nsubject of intense public scrutiny and oversight, through \r\nregular reporting by the Executive Branch, review by the \r\nDepartment of Justice Inspector General, and regular oversight \r\nhearings and activities of the Committee. The Committee has \r\ndetermined that the expiring authorities have generally been \r\ndemonstrated to be critical and effective authorities in \r\ncounterterrorism and counterespionage investigations, or \r\nauthorities necessary to ensure that investigators are fully \r\nequipped to swiftly and efficiently prevent or respond to acts \r\nof terrorism or espionage. Conversely, the oversight process \r\nhas not discovered any substantial claim that the provisions of \r\nthe USA PATRIOT Act had been abused.\r\n\r\nB. Legislation\r\n\r\n Accordingly, H.R. 3199 as reported from the Permanent \r\nSelect Committee on Intelligence permanently reauthorizes the \r\nexpiring provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act. As amended, the \r\nbill also reauthorizes Section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform \r\nand Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 through December 31, 2010. \r\nThe bill also includes provisions requested by the \r\nAdministration to extend to up to a year the maximum duration \r\nof certain FISA orders targeted against ``agents of foreign \r\npowers'' who are not U.S. persons and reforms to clarify \r\nconcerns that have been raised with respect to the original \r\nauthorities.\r\n The Committee's hearings suggested that some fair concerns \r\nhad been raised with respect to unintended ambiguities in the \r\noriginal law. Accordingly, the bill also contains sensible \r\nchanges to clear up those ambiguities once and for all without \r\ncompromising investigators. These provisions include four key \r\nreforms to Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, which allows \r\ninvestigators to obtain permission to access to certain \r\nbusiness records from judges:\r\n Establishes a relevance standard to \r\n textually clarify that Section 215 orders must be \r\n relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against \r\n international terrorism or clandestine intelligence \r\n activities. This provision is intended to clarify the \r\n original intention of the specification requirement and \r\n is not intended to ``raise'' the standard for the \r\n specification required under Section 215;\r\n Clarifies that judges have the discretion to \r\n modify requested orders;\r\n Clarifies that the recipient of a Section \r\n 215 order may discuss the order with an attorney to \r\n obtain legal advice and may challenge the order;\r\n Provides for a panel of judges from the FISA \r\n court to review challenges to the legality of a Section \r\n 215 order.\r\n The bill also includes a provision to require that federal \r\njudges responsible for wiretaps in criminal cases be notified \r\n(under seal) when information from those wiretaps is shared \r\nwith the intelligence community.\r\n\r\n Committee Consideration and Votes\r\n\r\n On July 13, 2005, the Committee met in open session and \r\nordered the bill H.R. 3199 favorably reported, as amended.\r\n Ms. Harman offered and, after debate, subsequently received \r\nunanimous consent to withdraw an en bloc amendment to modify \r\ncertain standards relating to the exercise of authorities \r\nprovided by Sections 206, 214 and 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, \r\nto modify authorities on review of motions to discover \r\nmaterials under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and \r\nto provide subsequent notice in specified circumstances to the \r\nsubjects of certain FISA search and surveillance who are United \r\nStates persons.\r\n Ms. Harman offered a modified version of an en bloc \r\namendment to modify certain standards relating to the exercise \r\nof authorities provided by Sections 206, 214 and 215 of the USA \r\nPATRIOT Act, to modify authorities on review of motions to \r\ndiscover materials under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance \r\nAct, and to provide subsequent notice in specified \r\ncircumstances to the subjects of certain FISA search and \r\nsurveillance who are United States persons. After debate, the \r\namendment was not agreed to by voice vote.\r\n Mr. Ruppersberger offered an amendment to extend certain \r\nUSA PATRIOT Act sunset requirements. After debate, the \r\namendment was not agreed to by voice vote.\r\n Ms. Eshoo offered an amendment relating to library and \r\nbookseller records. After debate, the amendment was not agreed \r\nto by voice vote.\r\n Mr. Boswell offered an amendment relating to notification \r\nto judges in specified circumstances under authorities provided \r\nby Section 206 of the USA PATRIOT Act (codified at Section 105 \r\nof the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act). After debate, \r\nthe amendment was adopted by voice vote.\r\n Mr. Hastings offered an amendment to extend the sunset \r\nprovision relating to authorities regarding individual \r\nterrorists as agents of foreign powers (Section 6001 of the \r\nIntelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004). \r\nAfter debate, the amendment was adopted by voice vote.\r\n By voice vote, the Committee adopted a motion by the \r\nChairman to favorably report the bill H.R. 3199 to the House, \r\nas amended, and to recommend that the bill as amended do pass.\r\n\r\n Section-by-Section Analysis and Explanation of Amendments\r\n\r\n The provisions of the bill are as follows:\r\n Section 1. Short Title.--provides that the short title of \r\nthe bill is the ``USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention \r\nReauthorization Act of 2005.''\r\n Section 2. References to PATRIOT Act.--Provides that, \r\nwithin the bill, the Uniting and Strengthening America by \r\nProviding Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct \r\nTerrorism shall be referred to as the ``USA PATRIOT Act''.\r\n Section 3. Repeal of USA PATRIOT Act Sunset Provision.--\r\nThis section repeals section 224 of the USA PATRIOT Act that \r\nstates authorities under sections 201, 202, 203(b) and (d), \r\n204, 206, 207, 209, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218, 220, 223, and 225 \r\nof the USA PATRIOT Act (P.L. 107-296) expire on December 31, \r\n2005.\r\n Section 4. Repeal of Sunset of Individual Terrorists as \r\nAgents of Foreign Powers.--This section repeals section 6001(b) \r\nof the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, \r\n(IRTPA) which applied the USA PATRIOT Act sunset to the new \r\ndefinition for ``Agent of a Foreign Power'' under section 6001. \r\nSection 6001 provides that ``Agent of a Foreign Power,'' for \r\nany person other than a United States person, includes a person \r\nwho ``engages in international terrorism or activities in \r\npreparation thereof''. The new definition reaches ``lone wolf'' \r\nterrorists engaged in international terrorism.\r\n Section 5. Repeal of Sunset Provision Relating to Section \r\n2332B and the Material Support Sections of Title 18, United \r\nStates Code.--This section repeals section 6603(g) of the \r\nIRTPA, which would have sunset section 6603. The sunset would \r\nallow a criminal offense, and not a law enforcement tool, to \r\nexpire. Furthermore, this sunset effectively makes the \r\nunderlying provision unconstitutional. Section 6603 of the \r\nIRTPA addressed the prohibition against providing material \r\nsupport to terrorists and amended the law to address court \r\nconcerns on the constitutionality of the material support \r\nprohibition.\r\n Section 6. Sharing of Electronic, Wire, and Oral \r\nInterception Information.--This section responds to concerns \r\nthat additional judicial oversight was needed for the sharing \r\nof criminal wiretap information to the intelligence community. \r\nSection 6 of the Act amends section 2517(6) of title 18, which \r\nwas added by section 203(b) of the USA PATRIOT Act, by \r\nrequiring that an attorney for the government shall file, under \r\nseal, a notice with a judge whose order authorized or approved \r\nthe interception of that communication, stating the fact that \r\nsuch contents were disclosed and the departments, agencies, or \r\nentities to which the disclosure was made.\r\n The Committee emphasizes that such notices shall be made \r\nunder seal, as well as its intention that the provision should \r\nbe implemented to insure the protection of the notices as well \r\nas intelligence sources and methods.\r\n Section 7. Duration of FISA of Non-United States Persons.--\r\nThis section would (1) Further extend the maximum duration of \r\norders for electronic surveillance and physical search targeted \r\nagainst all agents of foreign powers who are not U.S. persons. \r\nInitial orders authorizing searches and electronic surveillance \r\nwould be for periods of up to 120 days and renewal orders would \r\nextend for periods of up to one year; and (2) extend the \r\nmaximum duration of both initial and renewal orders for pen \r\nregister\/trap and trace surveillance, in cases where the \r\nGovernment certified that the information likely to be obtained \r\nis foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. \r\nperson, for a period of one year.\r\n Section 8. Access to Certain Business Records Under Section \r\n501 of FISA.--This section would amend section 215 of the USA \r\nPATRIOT Act to (1) to clarify that the information likely to be \r\nobtained is reasonably expected to: be (A) foreign intelligence \r\ninformation not concerning a U.S. person or (B) relevant to an \r\nongoing investigation to protect against international \r\nterrorism or clandestine intelligence activities; (2) clarify \r\nthat a FISA 215 order may be challenged; (3) clarify that a \r\nrecipient of a 215 order may consult with a lawyer and the \r\nappropriate people necessary to comply with the order; (4) \r\nclarify that the order will only be issued ``if the judge finds \r\nthat the requirements have been met;'' and (5) to set up a \r\njudicial review process that authorizes the judge to set aside \r\nor affirm a 215 order that has been challenged.\r\n The committee adopted two amendments. An amendment by Mr. \r\nBoswell provides that, within a reasonable period of time after \r\nsurveillance begins, the applicant shall notify a judge \r\nwhenever surveillance begins to be directed at a new facility \r\nor place under authorities provided by Section 206 of the USA \r\nPATRIOT Act (as codified in Section 105 of the Foreign \r\nIntelligence Surveillance Act). An amendment by Mr. Hastings \r\nprovides that Section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and \r\nTerrorism Prevention Act of 2004 shall expire on December 31, \r\n2010.\r\n\r\n Oversight Findings and Recommendations\r\n\r\n With respect to clause 3(c)(1) of rule XIII of the Rules of \r\nthe House of Representatives, the Committee held 2 hearings on \r\nreauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, receiving testimony \r\nfrom Deputy Attorney General James Comey as well as outside \r\nexperts and citizens' groups.\r\n\r\n General Performance Goals and Objectives\r\n\r\n In accordance with Clause (3)(c) of House rule XIII, the \r\nCommittee's performance goals and objectives are reflected in \r\nthe descriptive portions of this report.\r\n\r\n Constitutional Authority Statement\r\n\r\n The intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the \r\nUnited States government are carried out to support the \r\nnational security interests of the United States.\r\n Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution of the United \r\nStates provides, in pertinent part, that ``Congress shall have \r\npower * * * to pay the debts and provide for the common defense \r\nand general welfare of the United States; * * * ''; and ``to \r\nmake all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying \r\ninto execution * * * all other powers vested by this \r\nConstitution in the Government of the United States, or in any \r\nDepartment or Officer thereof.''\r\n\r\n Unfunded Mandate Statement\r\n\r\n Section 423 of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment \r\nControl Act (as amended by Section 101(a)(2) of the Unfunded \r\nMandates Reform Act, P.L. 104-4) requires a statement of \r\nwhether the provisions of the reported bill include unfunded \r\nmandates. In compliance with this requirement, the Committee \r\nhas received a letter from the Congressional Budget Office \r\nincluded herein.\r\n\r\n Budget Authority and Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate\r\n\r\n With respect to the requirements of clause 3(c)(2) of rule \r\nXIII of the House of Representatives and section 308(a) of the \r\nCongressional Budget Act of 1974 and with respect to \r\nrequirements of 3(c)(3) of rule XIII of the House of \r\nRepresentatives and section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act \r\nof 1974, the Committee has received the following cost estimate \r\nfor H.R. 3199 from the Director of the Congressional Budget \r\nOffice:\r\n\r\n U.S. Congress,\r\n Congressional Budget Office,\r\n Washington, DC, July 18, 2005.\r\nHon. Peter Hoekstra,\r\nChairman, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,\r\nHouse of Representatives, Washington, DC.\r\n Dear Mr. Chairman: The Congressional Budget Office has \r\nprepared the enclosed cost estimate for H.R. 3199, the USA \r\nPATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of 2005.\r\n If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be \r\npleased to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Jason \r\nWheelock.\r\n Sincerely,\r\n Douglas Holtz-Eakin, Director.\r\n Enclosure.\r\n\r\nH.R. 3199--USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of \r\n 2005\r\n\r\n CBO estimates that implementing H.R. 3199 would have no \r\nsignificant cost to the federal government. Enacting the bill \r\ncould affect direct spending and revenues, but CBO estimates \r\nthat any such effects would not be significant.\r\n The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing \r\nAppropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism \r\n(USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 (Public Law 107-56), as well as the \r\nIntelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 \r\n(Public Law 108-458), expanded the powers of federal law \r\nenforcement and intelligence agencies to investigate and \r\nprosecute terrorist acts. H.R. 3199 would permanently authorize \r\ncertain provisions of these acts, many of which will otherwise \r\nexpire on December 31, 2005. In addition, the bill would make \r\nseveral other changes to the laws relating to investigations of \r\npotential terrorist activity.\r\n Because those prosecuted and convicted under H.R. 3199 \r\ncould be subject to civil and criminal fines, the federal \r\ngovernment might collect additional fines if the legislation is \r\nenacted. Collections of civil fines are recorded in the budget \r\nas revenues. Criminal fines are recorded as revenues, then \r\ndeposited in the Crime Victims Fund and later spent. CBO \r\nexpects that any additional revenues and direct spending would \r\nnot be significant because of the relatively small number of \r\ncases affected.\r\n Section 4 of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (UMRA) \r\nexcludes from the application of that act any legislative \r\nprovisions that are necessary for national security. CBO has \r\ndetermined that the provisions of this bill are either excluded \r\nfrom UMRA because they are necessary for the national security \r\nor they contain no intergovernmental or private-sector \r\nmandates.\r\n On July 18, 2005, CBO transmitted a cost estimate for H.R. \r\n3199 as ordered reported by the House Committee on the \r\nJudiciary on July 13, 2005. The two versions of H.R. 3199 are \r\nsimilar and the cost estimates are identical.\r\n The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Jason Wheelock.\r\n This estimate was approved by Peter H. Fontaine, Deputy \r\nAssistant Director for Budget Analysis.\r\n\r\n Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported\r\n\r\n In compliance with clause 3(e) of rule XIII of the Rules of \r\nthe House of Representatives, changes in existing law made by \r\nthe bill, as reported, are shown as follows (existing law \r\nproposed to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new \r\nmatter is printed in italic, existing law in which no change is \r\nproposed is shown in roman):\r\n\r\n SECTION 224 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT\r\n\r\n\r\n[SEC. 224. SUNSET.\r\n\r\n [(a) In General.--Except as provided in subsection (b), this \r\ntitle and the amendments made by this title (other than \r\nsections 203(a), 203(c), 205, 208, 210, 211, 213, 216, 219, \r\n221, and 222, and the amendments made by those sections) shall \r\ncease to have effect on December 31, 2005.\r\n [(b) Exception.--With respect to any particular foreign \r\nintelligence investigation that began before the date on which \r\nthe provisions referred to in subsection (a) cease to have \r\neffect, or with respect to any particular offense or potential \r\noffense that began or occurred before the date on which such \r\nprovisions cease to have effect, such provisions shall continue \r\nin effect.]\r\n ---------- \r\n\r\n\r\nINTELLIGENCE REFORM AND TERRORISM PREVENTION ACT OF 2004\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n TITLE VI--TERRORISM PREVENTION\r\n\r\n Subtitle A--Individual Terrorists as Agents of Foreign Powers\r\n\r\nSEC. 6001. INDIVIDUAL TERRORISTS AS AGENTS OF FOREIGN POWERS.\r\n\r\n (a) * * *\r\n [(b) Sunset.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall be \r\nsubject to the sunset provision in section 224 of Public Law \r\n107-56 (115 Stat. 295), including the exception provided in \r\nsubsection (b) of such section 224.]\r\n (b) Sunset.--(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), the \r\namendment made by subsection (a) shall cease to have effect on \r\nDecember 31, 2010.\r\n (2) With respect to any particular foreign intelligence \r\ninvestigation that began before the date on which the amendment \r\nmade by subsection (a) ceases to have effect, such amendment \r\nshall continue in effect.\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n\r\nSubtitle E--Criminal History Background Checks\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n\r\nSEC. 6603. ADDITIONS TO OFFENSE OF PROVIDING MATERIAL SUPPORT TO \r\n TERRORISM.\r\n\r\n (a) * * *\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n [(g) Sunset Provision.--\r\n [(1) In general.--Except as provided in paragraph \r\n (2), this section and the amendments made by this \r\n section shall cease to be effective on December 31, \r\n 2006.\r\n [(2) Exception.--This section and the amendments made \r\n by this section shall continue in effect with respect \r\n to any particular offense that--\r\n [(A) is prohibited by this section or \r\n amendments made by this section; and\r\n [(B) began or occurred before December 31, \r\n 2006.]\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n ---------- \r\n\r\n\r\n SECTION 2517 OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE\r\n\r\nSec. 2517. Authorization for disclosure and use of intercepted wire, \r\n oral, or electronic communications\r\n\r\n (1) * * *\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n (6) Any investigative or law enforcement officer, or attorney \r\nfor the Government, who by any means authorized by this \r\nchapter, has obtained knowledge of the contents of any wire, \r\noral, or electronic communication, or evidence derived \r\ntherefrom, may disclose such contents to any other Federal law \r\nenforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national \r\ndefense, or national security official to the extent that such \r\ncontents include foreign intelligence or counterintelligence \r\n(as defined in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 \r\n(50 U.S.C. 401a)), or foreign intelligence information (as \r\ndefined in subsection (19) of section 2510 of this title), to \r\nassist the official who is to receive that information in the \r\nperformance of his official duties. Any Federal official who \r\nreceives information pursuant to this provision may use that \r\ninformation only as necessary in the conduct of that person's \r\nofficial duties subject to any limitations on the unauthorized \r\ndisclosure of such information. Within a reasonable time after \r\na disclosure of the contents of a communication under this \r\nsubsection, an attorney for the Government shall file, under \r\nseal, a notice with a judge whose order authorized or approved \r\nthe interception of that communication, stating the fact that \r\nsuch contents were disclosed and the departments, agencies, or \r\nentities to which the disclosure was made.\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n ---------- \r\n\r\n\r\nFOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n\r\n TITLE I--ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE WITHIN THE UNITED STATES FOR FOREIGN \r\nINTELLIGENCE PURPOSES\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n\r\n DESIGNATION OF JUDGES\r\n\r\n Sec. 103. (a) * * *\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n (e)(1) Three judges designated under subsection (a) who \r\nreside within 20 miles of the District of Columbia, or if all \r\nof such judges are unavailable, other judges of the court \r\nestablished under subsection (a) as may be designated by the \r\nPresiding Judge of such court (who is designated by the Chief \r\nJustice of the United States from among the judges of the \r\ncourt), shall comprise a petition review panel which shall have \r\njurisdiction to review petitions filed pursuant to section \r\n501(f)(1).\r\n (2) Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of \r\nthe USA PATRIOT and Terrorism Prevention Reauthorization Act of \r\n2005, the court established under subsection (a) shall develop \r\nand issue procedures for the review of petitions filed pursuant \r\nto section 501(f)(1) by the panel established under paragraph \r\n(1). Such procedures shall provide that review of a petition \r\nshall be conducted ex parte and in camera and shall also \r\nprovide for the designation of an Acting Presiding Judge.\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n\r\n ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER\r\n\r\n Sec. 105. (a) * * *\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n (c) An order approving an electronic surveillance under this \r\nsection shall--\r\n (1) * * *\r\n (2) direct--\r\n (A) * * *\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n (C) that such carrier, landlord, custodian, \r\n or other person maintain under security \r\n procedures approved by the Attorney General and \r\n the Director of National Intelligence any \r\n records concerning the surveillance or the aid \r\n furnished that such person wishes to retain; \r\n [and]\r\n (D) that the applicant compensate, at the \r\n prevailing rate, such carrier, landlord, \r\n custodian, or other person for furnishing such \r\n aid[.]; and\r\n (E) that, in cases where the facility or \r\n place at which surveillance will be directed is \r\n not known at the time the order is issued, the \r\n applicant shall notify a judge having \r\n jurisdiction under section 103 within a \r\n reasonable period of time, as determined by the \r\n court, after surveillance begins to be directed \r\n at a new facility or place, and that such \r\n notice shall contain a statement of the facts \r\n and circumstances relied upon by the applicant \r\n to justify the belief that the facility or \r\n place at which the electronic surveillance was \r\n directed is being used, or is about to be used, \r\n by the target of the electronic surveillance.\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n (e)(1) An order issued under this section may approve an \r\nelectronic surveillance for the period necessary to achieve its \r\npurpose, or for ninety days, whichever is less, except that (A) \r\nan order under this section shall approve an electronic \r\nsurveillance targeted against a foreign power, as defined in \r\nsection 101(a), (1), (2), or (3), for the period specified in \r\nthe application or for one year, whichever is less, and (B) an \r\norder under this Act for a surveillance targeted against an \r\nagent of a foreign power[, as defined in section 101(b)(1)(A)] \r\nwho is not a United States person may be for the period \r\nspecified in the application or for 120 days, whichever is \r\nless.\r\n (2) Extensions of an order issued under this title may be \r\ngranted on the same basis as an original order upon an \r\napplication for an extension and new findings made in the same \r\nmanner as required for an original order, except that (A) an \r\nextension of an order under this Act for a surveillance \r\ntargeted against a foreign power, a defined in section 101(a) \r\n(5) or (6), or against a foreign power as defined in section \r\n101(a)(4) that is not a United States person, may be for a \r\nperiod not to exceed one year if the judge finds probable cause \r\nto believe that no communication of any individual United \r\nStates person will be acquired during the period, and (B) an \r\nextension of an order under this Act for a surveillance \r\ntargeted against an agent of a foreign power [as defined in \r\nsection 101(b)(1)(A)] who is not a United States person may be \r\nfor a period not to exceed 1 year.\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n\r\n TITLE III--PHYSICAL SEARCHES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES FOR FOREIGN \r\nINTELLIGENCE PURPOSES\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n\r\n ISSUANCE OF AN ORDER\r\n\r\n Sec. 304. (a) * * *\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n (d)(1) An order issued under this section may approve a \r\nphysical search for the period necessary to achieve its \r\npurpose, or for 90 days, whichever is less, except that (A) an \r\norder under this section shall approve a physical search \r\ntargeted against a foreign power, as defined in paragraph (1), \r\n(2), or (3) of section 101(a), for the period specified in the \r\napplication or for one year, whichever is less, and (B) an \r\norder under this section for a physical search targeted against \r\nan agent of a foreign power [as defined in section \r\n101(b)(1)(A)] who is not a United States person may be for the \r\nperiod specified in the application or for 120 days, whichever \r\nis less.\r\n (2) Extensions of an order issued under this title may be \r\ngranted on the same basis as the original order upon an \r\napplication for an extension and new findings made in the same \r\nmanner as required for the original order, except that an \r\nextension of an order under this Act for a physical search \r\ntargeted against a foreign power, as defined in section 101(a) \r\n(5) or (6), or against a foreign power, as defined in section \r\n101(a)(4), that is not a United States person, or against an \r\nagent of a foreign power [as defined in section 101(b)(1)(A)] \r\nwho is not a United States person, may be for a period not to \r\nexceed one year if the judge finds probable cause to believe \r\nthat no property of any individual United States person will be \r\nacquired during the period.\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n\r\n TITLE IV--PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES FOR FOREIGN \r\nINTELLIGENCE PURPOSES\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n\r\n PEN REGISTERS AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND \r\n INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS\r\n\r\n Sec. 402. (a) * * *\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n [(e) An] (e)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), an order \r\nissued under this section shall authorize the installation and \r\nuse of a pen register or trap and trace device for a period not \r\nto exceed 90 days. Extensions of such an order may be granted, \r\nbut only upon an application for an order under this section \r\nand upon the judicial finding required by subsection (d). The \r\nperiod of extension shall be for a period not to exceed 90 \r\ndays.\r\n (2) In the case of an application under subsection (c) where \r\nthe applicant has certified that the information likely to be \r\nobtained is foreign intelligence information not concerning a \r\nUnited States person, an order, or an extension of an order, \r\nunder this section may be for a period not to exceed one year.\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n\r\n TITLE V--ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE \r\n PURPOSES\r\n\r\nSEC. 501. ACCESS TO CERTAIN BUSINESS RECORDS FOR FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE \r\n AND INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS.\r\n\r\n (a) * * *\r\n (b) Each application under this section--\r\n (1) * * *\r\n (2) shall specify that the records concerned are \r\n sought for an authorized investigation conducted in \r\n accordance with subsection (a)(2) [to obtain foreign \r\n intelligence information not concerning a United States \r\n person or to protect against international terrorism or \r\n clandestine intelligence activities.] and that the \r\n information likely to be obtained from the tangible \r\n things is reasonably expected to be (A) foreign \r\n intelligence information not concerning a United States \r\n person, or (B) relevant to an ongoing investigation to \r\n protect against international terrorism or clandestine \r\n intelligence activities.\r\n [(c)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, \r\nthe judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as \r\nmodified, approving the release of records if the judge finds \r\nthat the application meets the requirements of this section.]\r\n (c)(1) Upon an application made pursuant to this section, if \r\nthe judge finds that the application meets the requirements of \r\nsubsections (a) and (b), the judge shall enter an ex parte \r\norder as requested, or as modified, approving the release of \r\nrecords.\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n [(d) No person shall disclose to any other person (other than \r\nthose persons necessary to produce the tangible things under \r\nthis section) that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has \r\nsought or obtained tangible things under this section.]\r\n (d)(1) No person shall disclose to any person (other than a \r\nqualified person) that the United States has sought or obtained \r\ntangible things under this section.\r\n (2) An order under this section shall notify the person to \r\nwhom the order is directed of the nondisclosure requirement \r\nunder paragraph (1).\r\n (3) Any person to whom an order is directed under this \r\nsection who discloses that the United States has sought to \r\nobtain tangible things under this section to a qualified person \r\nin response to the order shall inform such qualified person of \r\nthe nondisclosure requirement under paragraph (1) and that such \r\nqualified person is also subject to such nondisclosure \r\nrequirement.\r\n (4) A qualified person shall be subject to any nondisclosure \r\nrequirement applicable to a person to whom an order is directed \r\nunder this section in the same manner as such person.\r\n (5) In this subsection, the term ``qualified person'' means--\r\n (A) any person necessary to produce the tangible \r\n things pursuant to an order under this section; or\r\n (B) an attorney to obtain legal advice in response to \r\n an order under this section.\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n (f)(1) A person receiving an order to produce any tangible \r\nthing under this section may challenge the legality of that \r\norder by filing a petition in the panel established by section \r\n103(e)(1). The Presiding Judge shall conduct an initial review \r\nof the petition. If the Presiding Judge determines that the \r\npetition is frivolous, the Presiding Judge shall immediately \r\ndeny the petition and promptly provide a written statement of \r\nthe reasons for the determination for the record. If the \r\nPresiding Judge determines that the petition is not frivolous, \r\nthe Presiding Judge shall immediately assign the petition to \r\none of the judges serving on such panel. The assigned judge \r\nshall promptly consider the petition in accordance with \r\nprocedures developed and issued pursuant to section 103(e)(2). \r\nThe judge considering the petition may modify or set aside the \r\norder only if the judge finds that the order does not meet the \r\nrequirements of this section or is otherwise unlawful. If the \r\njudge does not modify or set aside the order, the judge shall \r\nimmediately affirm the order and order the recipient to comply \r\ntherewith. A petition for review of a decision to affirm, \r\nmodify, or set aside an order by the United States or any \r\nperson receiving such order shall be to the court of review \r\nestablished under section 103(b), which shall have jurisdiction \r\nto consider such petitions. The court of review shall \r\nimmediately provide for the record a written statement of the \r\nreasons for its decision and, on petition of the United States \r\nor any person receiving such order for writ of certiorari, the \r\nrecord shall be transmitted under seal to the Supreme Court, \r\nwhich shall have jurisdiction to review such decision.\r\n (2) Judicial proceedings under this subsection shall be \r\nconcluded as expeditiously as possible. The judge considering a \r\npetition filed under this subsection shall provide for the \r\nrecord a written statement of the reasons for the decision. The \r\nrecord of proceedings, including petitions filed, orders \r\ngranted, and statements of reasons for decision, shall be \r\nmaintained under security measures established by the Chief \r\nJustice of the United States in consultation with the Attorney \r\nGeneral and the Director of National Intelligence.\r\n (3) All petitions under this subsection shall be filed under \r\nseal, and the court, upon the government's request, shall \r\nreview any government submission, which may include classified \r\ninformation, as well as the government's application and \r\nrelated materials, ex parte and in camera.\r\n\r\n * * * * * * *\r\n\r\n\r\n ADDITIONAL VIEWS\r\n\r\nPreliminary note\r\n We commend Chairman Hoekstra for taking the unprecedented \r\nstep of allowing a member of the press to attend the mark-up of \r\nH.R. 3199 and for making the transcript of the session \r\navailable to the public. This action demonstrates that the \r\nCommittee can have candid debate about intelligence policy in \r\nan unclassified setting. Unfortunately, the public was not \r\npermitted to attend this mark-up because it occurred in the \r\nCommittee's secure facility. We hope that future mark-ups will \r\ntake place in a venue accessible to all--so that the American \r\npeople can have confidence in our work.\r\nIntroduction\r\n The U.S. government needs effective tools to combat \r\nterrorism. The terrorist threat is real--and if we are going to \r\ndemand that the FBI uncover terror cells here in the U.S., we \r\nneed to give them the tools to do that.\r\n The last time Congress considered the PATRIOT Act, it was \r\nalso in the shadow of terrorism. It was just 45 days after 9\/\r\n11; we were bracing for more terror; the invasion of \r\nAfghanistan had begun; and Capitol Hill was hit with anthrax \r\nattacks. Given these intense pressures, Congress did a fairly \r\ndecent job with the PATRIOT Act, which modernized a number of \r\nlegal authorities and gave the FBI new tools to track \r\nterrorists here at home. But we can do better.\r\nImproving the PATRIOT Act\r\n The mark-up of H.R. 3199 was our Committee's opportunity to \r\nimprove the PATRIOT Act. As Deputy Attorney General Jim Comey \r\ntold our Committee when he briefed us, any expansion of \r\ngovernment power must be carefully justified and tailored so \r\nthat it does not facilitate abuse or unwarranted intrusions \r\ninto our privacy.\r\n Improving the PATRIOT Act is not a partisan issue. The SAFE \r\nAct, which makes improvements to PATRIOT Act authorities, is \r\nbipartisan legislation that had 71 cosponsors in the last \r\nCongress. The Sanders Amendment to the Science, State, Justice, \r\nCommerce FY 2006 Appropriations bill--which prohibited spending \r\nfunds to obtain library or bookstore documentary records under \r\nSeciton 215 of the Act, but properly excluded internet \r\nrecords--passed 238-187, with a large number of Republican \r\nvotes, including one House Permanent Select Committee on \r\nIntelligence (HPSCI) majority Member.\r\n H.R. 3199 is a good start. For example, it would allow the \r\nrecipients of Section 215 orders to consult with an attorney \r\nand challenge the order before a federal judge. The bill also \r\nexcludes some expansive provisions that our counterparts in the \r\nSenate adopted, including administrative subpoenas, mail \r\ncovers, and a broader definition of foreign intelligence.\r\n Our package of common-sense amendments (described below), \r\nwere shared with the Majority and were developed with input \r\nfrom a range of Members and outside groups. The Ranking Member \r\nalso personally shared our proposals with Attorney General \r\nGonzales and FBI Director Mueller. Our staffs have discussed \r\nthem on a bipartisan basis.\r\n The Committee received letters from the American Civil \r\nLiberties Union, as well as the Patriots to Restore Checks and \r\nBalances, a coalition led by former Rep. Bob Barr. Those \r\nletters, which are part of the official record of the mark-up, \r\nindicate support for efforts to improve the PATRIOT Act, along \r\nthe lines of our amendments.\r\n Of the five Democratic amendments offered at the mark-up, \r\ntwo passed on a voice vote by the Committee. Representative \r\nBoswell offered an amendment to impose a ``return'' requirement \r\non roving ``John Doe'' wiretaps under Section 206. \r\nRepresentative Hastings offered an amendment to sunset the \r\n``Lone Wolf'' provision in 2010.\r\n The Committee rejected three other amendments that we \r\nbelieve were meritorious. Representative Harman's en bloc \r\namendment would have made several critical changes to Sections \r\n206, 214 and 215. Representative Ruppersberger offered an \r\namendment to sunset all 10 expiring provisions under the \r\nCommittee's jurisdiction in 2009. Representative Eshoo offered \r\nan amendment to prevent Section 215 orders from being used to \r\nobtain library or bookstore documentary records. All three of \r\nthese amendments failed on voice vote.\r\n We are committed to offering these amendments on the floor, \r\nand we urge the Rules Committee to allow their consideration by \r\nthe full House.\r\n Our proposals are moderate. And they would not compromise \r\nthat ability to catch terrorists or spies. They will merely \r\nadjust the authorities of the PATRIOT Act to preserve our \r\nliberties.\r\n As Benjamin Franklin said more than 200 years ago: ``Those \r\nwho would sacrifice liberty to purchase a bit of security \r\ndeserve neither liberty nor security.''\r\nDetailed discussion of amendments\r\n Five amendments were offered by Committee Democrats.\r\n Representative Harman offered an en bloc amendment related \r\nto several sections of the PATRIOT Act.\r\n With respect to Sections 214 and 215, the Harman amendment \r\nwould require government Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act \r\n(FISA) applications for tangible items as well as pen register \r\nand trap and trace orders to assert there are ``specific and \r\narticulable facts'' giving reason to believe that the records \r\nsought relate to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign \r\npower, and to include an explanation that supports the \r\nassertion such facts exist.\r\n These provisions would retain the ability of the government \r\nto seek court approval to obtain items and information under \r\nSections 214 and 215. But, they would also align this sweeping \r\npower with the traditional FISA standard by requiring \r\nindividualized suspicion. Nothing in the amendment would hamper \r\nthe government's ability to go after suspected terrorists or \r\ntheir associates, such as 9-11 hijacker Mohammad Atta or his \r\nroommate.\r\n The Harman amendment would also prohibit Section 215 from \r\nbeing used for the production of library circulation records, \r\nlibrary patron lists, book sales records, or book customer \r\nlists. This mirrors the limitation included in an amendment \r\noffered by Representative Sanders to the Science, State \r\nJustice, Commerce FY 2006 Appropriations. That amendment passed \r\nthe full House 238-187 on June 15, 2005.\r\n With respect to Section 206, the amendment would modify the \r\nexpansive authority for ``John Doe'' roving wiretaps in three \r\nways. First, it would require the description of a target to be \r\n``sufficiently specific'' for the court to find probable cause \r\nto believe the target is a foreign power or an agent of a \r\nforeign power--something Department of Justice officials say \r\nthey already do. Second, it would also limit the time of \r\nsurveillance to the period reasonable to assume the target is \r\nnear the phone or computer to be tapped. Third, it would \r\nrequire the government to notify the FISA Court within a \r\nreasonable period of time after surveillance begins at a new \r\nfacility or place, and to provide an explanation of the facts \r\nand circumstances surrounding the decision to target a \r\nparticular facility or place. This requirement would allow the \r\nFISA Court to better assess whether ``John Doe'' roving \r\nwiretaps authorized under Section 206 were carried out \r\nproperly.\r\n Finally, the Harman amendment would modify FISA in \r\nadditional ways to protect due process rights of FISA targets. \r\nIt would require the court to disclose to criminal defendants \r\nor other aggrieved persons, and\/or their counsels, under \r\nprocedures and standards established in the Classified \r\nInformation Procedures Act (CIPA) (18 U.S.C. App. 3), \r\ninformation and materials gathered pursuant to FISA orders. \r\nThese procedures are used commonly in national security cases \r\nwhere individuals are prosecuted on the basis of secret \r\nevidence.\r\n It would also ensure that U.S. citizen FISA targets who are \r\ndetermined not to be an agent of a foreign power are notified \r\nthey were the target of FISA searches, surveillance, or pen \r\nregisters and traps and traces. Such notification would only \r\noccur after the Attorney General determines that disclosure \r\nwould not compromise an ongoing investigation. This would help \r\nensure that individuals--such as Brandon Mayfield who was \r\nwrongly jailed in connection with the Madrid bombings and later \r\nexonerated--are notified of surveillance and secret searches of \r\ntheir homes.\r\n The Harman en bloc amendment was not agreed to.\r\n Representative Ruppersberger offered an amendment to extend \r\nto December 31, 2009 the sunsets for intelligence-related \r\nsections of the PATRIOT Act and Section 6001 of the \r\nIntelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-458) \r\n(the so-called ``Lone Wolf'' provision). This provision would \r\nhave allowed law enforcement to continue to conduct \r\ninvestigations using these authorities. But, it would also \r\nforce Congress and the Executive Branch to reevaluate in four \r\nyears whether they are truly effective in fighting terrorism \r\nand their impact on civil liberties and privacy.\r\n The Ruppersberger amendment was not agreed to.\r\n An amendment offered by Representative Eshoo would have \r\nexempted library circulation records, library patron lists, \r\nbook sales records, or book customer lists from the list of \r\ntangible things authorized to be obtained under Section 215 of \r\nthe PATRIOT Act. This mirrors the limitation included in an \r\namendment offered by Representative Sanders to the Science, \r\nState, Justice, Commerce FY 2006 Appropriations bill which \r\npassed the House 238-187 on June 15, 2005.\r\n During Committee hearings, Department of Justice officials \r\nstated that it has not sought library or bookstore documentary \r\nrecords, and the Committee has received no testimony indicating \r\nthat this power under Section 215 is necessary to stop \r\nterrorism. These records may always be obtained by law \r\nenforcement through other methods, such as warrants or \r\nsubpoenas.\r\n The Eshoo amendment was not agreed to.\r\n Representative Boswell offered an amendment to Section 206 \r\nof the PATRIOT Act. Section 206, which has been the center of \r\nmuch debate, gives the government broad authority to conduct \r\ncourt-approved roving wiretaps under FISA when neither the \r\nidentify nor the location of the target is known.\r\n The Boswell amendment would require the government to \r\nnotify the FISA Court within a reasonable period of time after \r\nsurveillance begins at a new facility or place, and to provide \r\nan explanation of the facts and circumstancessurrounding the \r\ndecision to target a particular facility or place. This requirement \r\nwould allow the FISA Court to better assess whether ``John Doe'' roving \r\nwiretaps authorized under Section 206 were carried out properly. Such \r\nenhanced transparency is essential for ensuring proper judicial \r\noversight of this significant authority.\r\n The Boswell amendment was agreed to by voice vote.\r\n An amendment offered by Representative Alcee Hastings would \r\nextend until 2010 the sunset of Section 6001 of the \r\nIntelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (P.L. 108-\r\n458), the so-called ``Lone Wolf'' provision. The Lone Wolf \r\nprovision, which sunsets in December 2005, broke from the \r\ntradition of FISA by abandoning the requirement that a non-U.S. \r\nperson, suspected terrorist target have a nexus to a foreign \r\npower. Although only seven months have passed since the Lone \r\nWolf provision became law, H.R. 3199 would have made it \r\npermanent. This short period is inadequate for the government \r\nand public to assess the effectiveness and impact of this \r\nsignificant expansion of government authorities.\r\n The Hastings amendment would allow the government to retain \r\nthe authority to target Lone Wolf terrorists and ensure \r\ninvestigations initiated before the sunset date are allowed to \r\ncontinue. Moreover, it would ensure this significant expansion \r\nof power is subject to a meaningful trial period before it is \r\nmade permanent.\r\n The Hastings amendment was agreed to by voice vote.\r\n\r\nMotion to report the bill favorably\r\n\r\n The motion to report favorably H.R. 3199, as amended, to \r\nthe House of Representatives was adopted by voice vote. \r\nRepresentatives Hastings, Eshoo, Holt and Tierney asked that \r\nthe record reflect that they voted ``no'' on the motion.\r\n\r\n Jane Harman.\r\n Silvestre Reyes.\r\n Leonard L. Boswell.\r\n Bud Cramer.\r\n Anna G. Eshoo.\r\n C.A. Dutch Ruppersberger.\r\n\r\n ADDITIONAL VIEWS\r\n\r\n I accept the Minority's Additional Views, above, but find \r\nthat the last paragraph of the introduction in some respects \r\nseems to omit procedural faults in the 2001 consideration and \r\naction on the so-called Patriot Act. A fuller account would \r\nrecord: that the Judiciary Committee of the House considered \r\nand passed by a large majority--if not unanimously--a version \r\nthat most members believed acceptably struck a balance between \r\nthe need to arm intelligence and law enforcement authorities \r\nwith proper tools and the maintenance of constitutional civil \r\nrights. Those provisions where disagreement existed were \r\n``sunsetted.''\r\n In the dark of night during October 2001, the Majority \r\nParty's Rules Committee affected a Rule, passage of which \r\nstruck the Judiciary Committee's product and substituted the \r\nfinal version now before Congress. That final version, in the \r\nview of a number of Members, and in the view of scores of local \r\ncommunities, experts and others--intruded needlessly upon civil \r\nliberties as it departed from the Judiciary Committee's work.\r\n Numerous reasonable recommendations for correcting such \r\nexcesses have been suggested. They would continue to provide \r\nneeded tools to officials as they confront terrorist \r\nactivities, while upholding the Constitution's hard fought and \r\nhard won rights for individuals. Congress has the chance during \r\nthis review of the law to correct the problems contained in the \r\nearlier legislation through questionable procedural conduct.\r\n\r\n John F. Tierney.<\/pre>\n
109th Congress Rept. 109-174 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1st Session Part 2 ====================================================================== USA PATRIOT AND TERRORISM PREVENTION REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005 _______ July 18, 2005.–Committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4181,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":true,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[72,57],"tags":[116,118],"class_list":["post-6258","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-hearings-u-s-house-of-representatives","category-legislation","tag-hearings","tag-legislation"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p89tuq-1CW","jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/12\/Government-Congress.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6258","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6258"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6258\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6259,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6258\/revisions\/6259"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4181"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6258"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6258"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6258"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}