[Senate Hearing 107-506]\r\n[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]\r\n\r\n\r\n S. Hrg. 107-506\r\n \r\n A LICENSE TO BREAK THE LAW? PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF DRIVER'S \r\n LICENSES\r\n=======================================================================\r\n\r\n HEARING\r\n\r\n before the\r\n\r\n OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,\r\n RESTRUCTURING, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA\r\n SUBCOMMITTEE\r\n\r\n of the\r\n\r\n COMMITTEE ON\r\n GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS\r\n UNITED STATES SENATE\r\n\r\n ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS\r\n\r\n SECOND SESSION\r\n\r\n __________\r\n\r\n APRIL 16, 2002\r\n\r\n __________\r\n\r\n Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE\r\n80-295 WASHINGTON : 2002\r\n_____________________________________________________________________________\r\nFor Sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office\r\nInternet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; (202) 512-1800 \r\nFax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS\r\n\r\n JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman\r\nCARL LEVIN, Michigan FRED THOMPSON, Tennessee\r\nDANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TED STEVENS, Alaska\r\nRICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine\r\nROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio\r\nMAX CLELAND, Georgia PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico\r\nTHOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi\r\nJEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah\r\nMARK DAYTON, Minnesota JIM BUNNING, Kentucky\r\n Joyce A. Rechtschaffen, Staff Director and Counsel\r\n Hannah S. Sistare, Minority Staff Director and Counsel\r\n Darla D. Cassell, Chief Clerk\r\n\r\n ------ \r\n\r\nOVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING, AND THE DISTRICT OF \r\n COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE\r\n\r\n RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois, Chairman\r\nDANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio\r\nROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey TED STEVENS, Alaska\r\nTHOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine\r\nJEAN CARNAHAN, Missouri PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico\r\nMARK DAYTON, Minnesota THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi\r\n Marianne Clifford Upton, Staff Director and Chief Counsel\r\n Mark L. Keam, Counsel, Senator Durbin\r\n Andrew Richardson, Minority Staff Director\r\n Mason C. Alinger, Minority Professional Staff Member\r\n Julie L. Vincent, Chief Clerk\r\n C O N T E N T S\r\n\r\n ------ \r\nOpening statement:\r\n Page\r\n Senator Durbin............................................... 1\r\n\r\n WITNESSES\r\n Tuesday, April 16, 2002\r\n\r\nTheodore W. Wren, Victim of Idnetity Theft....................... 4\r\nMary Ann Viverette, Chief of Police, Gaithersburg, Maryland, on \r\n behalf of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.... 7\r\nrichard J. Varn, Chief Information Officer, State of Iowa, on \r\n behalf of the National Governors Associaiton................... 9\r\nHon. Barbara P. Allen, State Senator, Eighth District, State of \r\n Kansas......................................................... 11\r\nBetty L. Serian, Deputy Secretary for Safety Administration, \r\n Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, on behalf of the \r\n American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators........... 13\r\nBarry J. Goleman, Vice President, Public Sector, American \r\n Management Systems, Inc........................................ 15\r\nJ. Bradley Jansen, Deputy Director, Center for Technology Policy, \r\n Free Congress Foundation....................................... 17\r\n\r\n Alphabetical List of Witnesses\r\n\r\nAllen, Hon. Barbara P.:\r\n Testimony.................................................... 11\r\n Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 53\r\nGoleman, Barry J.:\r\n Testimony.................................................... 15\r\n Prepared statement with an attachment........................ 66\r\nJansen, J. Bradley:\r\n Testimony.................................................... 17\r\n Prepared statement........................................... 80\r\nSerian, Betty L.:\r\n Testimony.................................................... 13\r\n Prepared statement........................................... 58\r\nVarn, Richard J.:\r\n Testimony.................................................... 9\r\n Prepared statement with attachments.......................... 35\r\nViverette, Mary Ann:\r\n Testimony.................................................... 7\r\n Prepared statement........................................... 29\r\nWren, Theodore, W.:\r\n Testimony.................................................... 4\r\n Prepared statement........................................... 27\r\n\r\n Appendix\r\n\r\nChart submitted by Senator Durbin entitled ``Forged Documents \r\n (Identity Cards, Record Books, Passports)'' with attached \r\n photos......................................................... 85\r\nChart submitted by AAMVA entitled ``77% of Americans favor \r\n Congressional legislation to modify the licensing process and \r\n ID security''.................................................. 95\r\nFood Marketing Institute, prepared statement..................... 96\r\nRaul Yzaguirre, President and CEO, National Council of La Raza, \r\n prepared statement............................................. 98\r\nMichael J. Eastman, Director, Government Relations, LPA, Inc., \r\n prepared statement............................................. 112\r\nLetter submitted by Mr. Jansen from Marc Rotenberg, Executive \r\n Director and Mihir Kshirsagar, IPIOP Fellow, epic.org, \r\n electronic privacy information center, with attachments........ 124\r\nArticle entitled ``IDs--Not That Easy, Questions About Nationwide \r\n Identity Systems,'' Stephen T. Kent and Lynette I. Millett, \r\n Editors, National Academy Press................................ 151\r\n\r\n\r\n A LICENSE TO BREAK THE LAW?\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF\r\n\r\n\r\n\r\n DRIVER'S LICENSES\r\n\r\n ---------- \r\n\r\n\r\n TUESDAY, APRIL 16, 2002\r\n\r\n U.S. Senate,\r\n Oversight of Government Management, Restructuring,\r\n and the District of Columbia Subcommittee,\r\n of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,\r\n Washington, DC.\r\n The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in \r\nroom SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard J. \r\nDurbin, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.\r\n Present: Senator Durbin.\r\n\r\n OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR DURBIN\r\n\r\n Senator Durbin. Good morning. This hearing will come to \r\norder. Thank you all for being here. Today, the Senate \r\nSubcommittee on Oversight of Government Management holds a \r\nhearing entitled, ``A License to Break the Law? Protecting the \r\nIntegrity of Driver's Licenses and State IDs.''\r\n On August 1, 2001, two men named Hani Hanjour and Khalid \r\nAl-Mihdhar drove a van from New Jersey to the Virginia \r\nDepartment of Motor Vehicles office located across the Potomac \r\nRiver just a few miles from where we are sitting this morning. \r\nIn the parking lot of that DMV, they asked around until they \r\nfound someone willing to lie and to vouch for their Virginia \r\nresidency. They met Luis Martinez-Flores and Herbert \r\nVillalobos, who, for a price, were willing to help. Hanjour and \r\nAl-Mihdhar paid these strangers $50 each and received notarized \r\nforms which claimed that the two transients were, in fact, \r\nVirginia residents.\r\n Using these fake documents, Hanjour and Al-Mihdhar walked \r\ninto the DMV, stood in line, like all of us would, had their \r\nphotos taken, and walked out with authentic State-issued \r\nVirginia photo ID cards. The next day, on August 2, 2001, \r\nHanjour and Al-Mihdhar returned to the same Arlington DMV \r\noffice with two friends, Salem Al-Hazmi and Majed Moqed. \r\nHanjour and Al-Mihdhar helped Al-Hazmi and Moqed obtain \r\nVirginia ID cards of their own by vouching that they lived \r\ntogether in the State of Virginia. After all, why should the \r\nclerk behind the DMV counter have any doubts? Hanjour and Al-\r\nMihdhar produced their Virginia IDs to prove their in-State \r\nresidence.\r\n On the same day, Abdul Al-Omari and Ahmed Al-Ghamdi, who \r\nwere renting a room at a Maryland motel, contacted Kenys \r\nGalicia, a Virginia legal secretary and notary public, through \r\na referral from Luis Martinez-Flores, the same person who was \r\nhanging around the Arlington DMV the day before. Al Omari and \r\nAl-Ghamdi paid Galicia to have her prepare false notarized \r\naffidavits stating that the two men lived in Virginia. Using \r\nthese fake documents, the two went to a Virginia motor vehicles \r\noffice and received State-issued ID cards.\r\n On the morning of September 11, 2001, Al-Mihdhar, Hanjour, \r\nAl-Hazmi, and Moqed boarded American Airlines Flight 77 from \r\nWashington Dulles Airport headed for Los Angeles. They all used \r\ntheir Virginia ID cards to board the plane. The same morning, \r\nAl-Omari used his Virginia ID card to board American Airlines \r\nFlight 11 in Boston, bound for Los Angeles. At the same \r\nairport, Al-Ghamdi used his ID card to board United Airlines \r\nFlight 175, also bound for Los Angeles.\r\n We all know what happened to those three flights and \r\nanother, United Airlines Flight 93, that never made it to their \r\nintended destinations that day. Instead, the commercial jets \r\ntragically became weapons of mass destruction at the hands of \r\nthese terrorists. These terrorists bought their way into our \r\nshaky, unreliable, and dangerous system of government-issued \r\nidentification. With these phoney cards, doors opened across \r\nAmerica, including the doors of these doomed aircraft.\r\n Since September 11, our Nation has been struggling to \r\nunderstand how such heinous crimes could have occurred here in \r\nAmerica. As we reflect upon the events of the past few months, \r\nwe have come to realize that our system of democracy which \r\nallows all of us to enjoy our freedom is vulnerable to abuse by \r\nthose who seek to destroy that freedom.\r\n The terrorists mentioned above, along with their co-\r\nconspirators, knew exactly how to take advantage of our open \r\nand free society. In addition to Virginia, these terrorists \r\ntargeted Florida, a State that at the time did not require any \r\nproof of residency from anyone. In fact, any tourist could walk \r\ninto a motor vehicle office, fill out a form on his own, and \r\nreceive a Florida license or ID card at that time. At least 13 \r\nof the 19 terrorists held driver's licenses or ID cards from \r\nFlorida. A few of the 19 held licenses or cards from more than \r\none State, including from California, Arizona, and Maryland, \r\nwhile only one did not appear to hold any American ID.\r\n Some received duplicate cards from the same State within \r\nmonths of September. These foreign terrorists knew that a key \r\nto their devious plans was to come to America and blend in with \r\neverybody else until they were ready to take on their murderous \r\nmission, and one way they blended in with the rest of America \r\nwas to obtain a driver's license or a State-issued ID card that \r\nhelped them present a cover of legitimacy.\r\n They knew that the driver's license is the most widely-used \r\nform of personal identification. Across America, law \r\nenforcement agencies, retailers, financial institutions, \r\nairlines, and employers acknowledge the presentation of a \r\nperson's driver's license as an acceptable and reliable method \r\nof verifying a person's identity.\r\n The driver's license is also a key that opens many doors. \r\nAnyone who can produce a valid driver's license can access just \r\nabout anything. It can get you access to a motel room, \r\nmembership in a gym, airline tickets, flight lessons, and even \r\nthe purchase of weapons, all without anyone ever questioning \r\nyou about who you really are. If you can produce a driver's \r\nlicense, we assume you are legal, you are legitimate, you are \r\nfor real.\r\n The use of fake IDs is one of the oldest tricks in the book \r\nfor criminals. It is also one of the oldest traditions of \r\nadolescence and a rite of passage for teenagers, to casually \r\nuse a borrowed or tampered ID to buy alcohol or tobacco \r\nproducts or just to get into a nightclub. But after September \r\n11, use of fake IDs is no longer just a teenage trick or merely \r\nabout drunk drivers, as serious as that is, trying to hide \r\ntheir bad driving records using multiple licenses. It is about \r\nour national security.\r\n I want to show you a page from the al Qaeda terrorist \r\nmanual. I am sure you cannot read it from there, but this was \r\nfound in Manchester, England. Police officials during the \r\nsearch of an al Qaeda member's home found this particular \r\ndocument and Attorney General Ashcroft presented it to our \r\nSenate Judiciary Committee last year. It is obvious that the \r\nSeptember 11 terrorists were well trained by al Qaeda. They \r\nfollowed the instructions flawlessly. Here is an example of how \r\nsuccessful they were.\r\n Each obtained the form of a photo ID, but it is not only \r\nforeign terrorists who use fake IDs or IDs obtained through \r\nfraudulent means. Seven years ago this week, Timothy McVeigh \r\nused a fake ID to rent the Ryder truck that he drove into \r\nOklahoma City. As part of his plot to blow up the Federal \r\nBuilding, McVeigh picked up a fake driver's license in the name \r\nof ``Robert King.'' The card even listed a false birthday of \r\nApril 19 as some cruel inside joke. That is the day that \r\nMcVeigh executed his terrorist attack against fellow Americans, \r\nwhich was planned to fall exactly 2 years after the Waco \r\nincident of April 19, 1993.\r\n Another example, fugitive James Charles Kopp was arrested \r\nin France in March of last year after evading our law \r\nenforcement officials for almost 3 years. Kopp was accused of \r\nthe October 1998 murder of abortion clinic doctor Barnett \r\nSlepian, who was shot and killed as he stood in the kitchen of \r\nhis home in Amherst, New York. With help from other \r\nantiabortion activists, Kopp used a variety of fake driver's \r\nlicenses and passports, changed aliases frequently, and moved \r\nin and out of the country.\r\n So as we look to defending America, it is critical that we \r\ncarefully examine how our States issue driver's licenses and ID \r\ncards today and determine if it makes sense for every State to \r\ncontinue to maintain its own unique policy and procedures for \r\nthe issuance process. For example, some States independently \r\nverify the breeder documents, such as birth certificates and \r\npassports provided by applicants, while others accept them at \r\nface value. Some States ask the applicants' Social Security \r\nnumbers, others do not. Some States ask for proof of legal \r\nstatus in the country, others do not. Some States take \r\nfingerprints of the applicants, others do not.\r\n We also need to examine how secure the cards are \r\nthemselves. For example, each of the 50 U.S. States and the \r\nDistrict of Columbia issues driver's licenses and ID cards that \r\nvary widely in the level of security and resistance to \r\ntampering, from States that incorporate high-tech biometric \r\nidentifiers to States that do not even require a photo on their \r\ncards.\r\n I recognize many States since September 11 are taking \r\nproactive, sensible steps to tighten their DMV systems, but I \r\nbelieve we need a nationwide effort to coordinate those \r\nactivities.\r\n To help us understand the extent of the weaknesses and \r\nloopholes that exist in our driver's license issuance process \r\nand the usage of cards today, this Subcommittee has invited \r\nseven individuals to discuss these problems and to offer \r\nsolutions. I am pleased to introduce the following witnesses \r\nand look forward to their testimony.\r\n I would like to welcome and introduce today's panel, Ted \r\nWern, an attorney with Kirkland and Ellis in Chicago, thank you \r\nfor being here; Mary Ann Viverette, Chief of Police of \r\nGaithersburg, Maryland, on behalf of the International \r\nAssociation of Chiefs of Police; Richard Varn, Chief \r\nInformation Officer for the State of Iowa, who is here on \r\nbehalf of the National Governors Association; the Hon. Barbara \r\nAllen, State Senator representing the Eighth District of \r\nKansas; Betty Serian, Deputy Secretary for Safety \r\nAdministration of the Pennsylvania Department of \r\nTransportation, here on behalf of the American Association of \r\nMotor Vehicle Administrators, who have been extremely helpful \r\nin putting together this hearing; Barry Goleman, Vice President \r\nof AMS State and Local Solutions; and Bradley Jansen, Deputy \r\nDirector of the Center for Technology Policy at the Free \r\nCongress Foundation.\r\n Thank you all for coming. We are looking forward to your \r\ntestimony. It is customary in this Subcommittee to swear in all \r\nwitnesses, so if you would please rise and raise your right \r\nhand.\r\n Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the \r\ntruth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you, \r\nGod?\r\n Mr. Wern. I do.\r\n Chief Viverette. I do.\r\n Mr. Varn. I do.\r\n Ms. Allen. I do.\r\n Ms. Serian. I do.\r\n Mr. Goleman. I do.\r\n Mr. Jansen. I do.\r\n Senator Durbin. Let the record reflect that the witnesses \r\nanswered in the affirmative and will not be asked to leave. \r\n[Laughter.]\r\n That was a joke. I would ask that you limit your oral \r\nstatements to about 5 minutes. I know that is tough because \r\nthis is a complicated issue. I will remind you, your entire \r\nstatement will be entered into the record.\r\n Mr. Wern, would you like to begin?\r\n\r\n TESTIMONY OF THEODORE W. WERN,\\1\\ VICTIM OF IDENTITY THEFT\r\n\r\n Mr. Wern. Thank you. First, I would like to thank you all \r\nfor the opportunity of coming here and just let you know how \r\ntruly honored I am to be a part of this process in any way.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n \\1\\ The prepared statement of Mr. Wern appears in the Appendix on \r\npage 27.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n My name is Ted Wern. I am an attorney in Chicago, Illinois, \r\nand 4 years ago, beginning in the spring of 1998, a person in \r\nColumbus, Ohio, stole some of my mail, and in that mail were \r\ndocuments containing three vital pieces of information, my \r\nname, my Social Security number, and my date of birth. Using \r\nthat information as well as a fake identification card, that \r\nperson departed on a crime and spending spree that was \r\nunimaginable to me at the time, and I still cannot quite put it \r\ninto perspective.\r\n There are two categories of crimes that he committed. \r\nFirst, financial crimes. He incurred up to $50,000 in bad debt \r\nthat I knew about. He had telephone accounts, cable bills, and \r\nutility accounts. He was able to board airline flights using \r\ntickets issued in my name, of course, purchased with credit \r\ncards issued in my name. He was able to rent a U-Haul truck. He \r\nwas able to rent vehicles. He was able to enjoy all of the \r\nfinancial freedoms that we all take for granted.\r\n The second category of crimes were a bit more bold and \r\nthese involved traffic violations. This man would be stopped by \r\npolice--he apparently was not a very good driver. He was \r\nstopped by police on four separate occasions and he told the \r\npolice that he was me, that he forgot his driver's license, and \r\non those four occasions, somehow, the violations went onto my \r\ndriving record. All along, I had no idea this was happening and \r\nthese arrest warrants were issued in my name and all along I am \r\njust driving around in Ohio thinking that there are not any \r\nproblems.\r\n One of those occasions was actually a DUI, and under the \r\nsame circumstances, he was able to convince the officers, by \r\ngiving all of this information that he had memorized so well \r\nand claiming that he has lost his driver's license. In those \r\nsituations, we think that there was not an actual identity card \r\npresented, but it is hard to really know.\r\n The end result was that warrants were issued in my name. I \r\nwas forced to go to court and appear as Ted Wern under these \r\ntraffic violations and convince numerous judges that these were \r\nnot committed by me. Those were the difficulties in remedying \r\nthe traffic violations, but to be honest, what took more time \r\nand much more expense was to remedy each one of the credit \r\naccounts that this person created.\r\n For every credit card, and there were many, probably into \r\nthe twenties, every credit card and every account, there was a \r\nhalf-hour of telephone conversations, numerous letters, \r\nnotarizing of documents. There is a very elaborate process that \r\none has to go through to clear these from your name, and the \r\nmost difficult aspect is that you get better at clearing these \r\nfrom your name after you keep doing it. But the better you get \r\nand the quicker you clear your record, the more easy it is for \r\nhim to get more credit because you have now cleared your \r\nrecord, your name is clear, and he can just spend more freely.\r\n The same applies for the traffic violations. Once I cleared \r\nthe warrants, I had a clear record, so when he used my \r\ninformation to a police officer, he did not get arrested for an \r\noutstanding warrant in my name.\r\n With all that said, despite those problems, the financial \r\neffects, the inconveniences, the emotional effects of knowing \r\nthat there is someone out there living a much richer lifestyle \r\nthan you are living now on your name and on your credit. Aside \r\nfrom all that, I really do consider myself one of the more \r\nfortunate victims.\r\n For example, I am an attorney. It is my job to write \r\nforceful letters, to navigate corporate bureaucracies and to \r\nfollow up with people and it was much easier for me to do that. \r\nIt came natural to me. But there are quite a few people out \r\nthere who do not have those resources. In fact, I volunteer for \r\nan organization out of San Diego, the Identity Theft Resource \r\nCenter. I help victims in Illinois deal with these problems and \r\nI get a couple of E-mails a week from people--bright, educated \r\npeople who just have no idea how to start and complete the \r\nprocess.\r\n Yesterday, in an attempt to be a little more presentable \r\nfor this hearing, I decided to get a haircut and the \r\nhairdresser happened to be a woman from El Salvador who just 3 \r\nmonths after she came to this country had her identity stolen. \r\nAt the time, her English was not very good and it took years \r\nfor her to clear her record.\r\n So despite my problems and the heartache it caused, I was \r\ncertainly one of the more fortunate victims, especially given \r\nthat my perpetrator was caught. He is now in jail. He is off \r\nthe streets. Many people are not that fortunate. Most \r\nperpetrators get to stay out there for a while because, as you \r\nwill hear today, it is a pretty difficult crime to catch. It \r\nhappens sometimes not even on paper.\r\n So with all of that said, what I would like to emphasize \r\nhere is that this is an extremely difficult situation to remedy \r\nafter it has happened to you. It has taken years for me. I \r\nwould like to say that government and that law enforcement are \r\nable to correct these problems really easily, but the reality \r\nis, once it is committed, it is your burden as a victim to \r\nclear these things up. You cannot ask a police officer or a \r\nlawyer to go in and convince creditors that you are who you say \r\nyou are. That is something, as we all know when we make \r\ntelephone calls and prove that we hold a particular account or \r\nwhatever, it is something only you can do.\r\n So what I would like to emphasize is that once this happens \r\nto somebody, the process for clearing it up is extremely long \r\nand extremely painful. So given the limited resources that we \r\nhave, the need that we have to deal with this so quickly in \r\nlight of the September 11 attacks, I think we are doing the \r\nright thing to focus on the prevention end right now. I mean, \r\nwe will get to how to clear it up, how to create a system to \r\nhelp people overcome this problem. Right now, as I look back on \r\nmy experience, I wish there was a more rigorous system that \r\nwould prevent somebody from getting that information, from \r\nusing it freely, from getting a fake identification card.\r\n So I think at this point, we are doing the right thing. We \r\nare focusing on prevention and I hope that this panel and this \r\nsystem can do everything in its power to make this all stop.\r\n So once again, thank you for the opportunity for coming \r\nhere and it is an honor.\r\n Senator Durbin. Thank you. Nice haircut. [Laughter.]\r\n Chief Viverette.\r\n\r\n TESTIMONY OF MARY ANN VIVERETTE,\\1\\ CHIEF OF POLICE, \r\n GAITHERSBURG, MARYLAND, ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL \r\n ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE\r\n\r\n Chief Viverette. Good morning. I am pleased to be here \r\ntoday on behalf of the International Association of Chiefs of \r\nPolice. As you may know, the IACP is the world's oldest and \r\nlargest organization of law enforcement executives. It was \r\nfounded in 1893 and with a current membership exceeding 19,000.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n \\1\\ The prepared statement of Chief Viverette appears in the \r\nAppendix on page 29.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n At the outset, I would like to thank you for holding this \r\nhearing today. From a law enforcement perspective, the \r\nimportance of ensuring the integrity of identification \r\ndocuments cannot be overstated. Even prior to September 11, the \r\nIACP had been concerned with the availability of false \r\nidentification documents and the ease in which false \r\ninformation could be used to obtain valid State-issued driver's \r\nlicenses.\r\n Law enforcement has seen that the ability of individuals to \r\nmisidentify themselves can have serious, often tragic, \r\nrepercussions in our communities. For example, teenagers often \r\nseek to obtain false identification documents so that they can \r\npurchase alcohol. As we all know, underage consumption of \r\nalcohol often has fatal results. The National Highway Traffic \r\nSafety Administration reports that in the United States, \r\ndrivers between the ages of 16 and 21 account for just 7 \r\npercent of all drivers in this Nation, yet are involved in 15 \r\npercent of all alcohol-related fatalities.\r\n Additionally, individuals who have had their license \r\nsuspended or revoked in one State because of their failure to \r\noperate a vehicle in a safe manner have all too often been able \r\nto go to neighboring States and acquire a new license under \r\nfalse pretenses. As a result, these unsafe drivers are back on \r\nthe roads of our communities. Law enforcement officers who may \r\nencounter such individuals will rely on their license to \r\nidentify the driver's infraction history and will, therefore, \r\nbe unaware of the driver's actual status.\r\n Off the roadways, the ease with which criminals can \r\nfraudulently obtain a valid license or manufacture a \r\ncounterfeit one greatly facilitates their ability to commit \r\ncrimes involving identity theft and identity fraud. In \r\naddition, each year, law enforcement officers expend thousands \r\nof hours in efforts to properly identify criminal suspects who \r\nhave misidentified themselves to police.\r\n However, as we all realize, the events of September 11 \r\ngreatly increase our need to ensure that the integrity of the \r\ndriver's license issuance process is enhanced and that the \r\nability of law enforcement officers to detect fraudulent \r\nlicenses is improved. As the September 11 attacks demonstrated, \r\nthe local police and other public safety personnel will often \r\nbe the first responders to a terrorist attack. However, the \r\nrole of the State and local law enforcement agencies is not \r\nlimited to responding to these events. These agencies can and \r\nmust play a vital role in the investigation and prevention of \r\nfuture attacks.\r\n Across the United States, there are more than 16,000 State \r\nand local law enforcement agencies. These agencies and the \r\n700,000 officers they employ daily patrol the streets of our \r\ncities and towns, and as a result, have an intimate knowledge \r\nof the communities they serve and have developed close \r\nrelationships with the citizens they protect. These \r\nrelationships provide State and local law enforcement agencies \r\nwith the ability to effectively track down information related \r\nto terrorists. Often, State and local agencies can accomplish \r\nthese tasks in a more effective and timely fashion than their \r\nFederal counterparts, who may be unfamiliar with the community \r\nand its citizens.\r\n In addition, police officers on everyday patrol, making \r\ntraffic stops, answering calls for service, performing \r\ncommunity policing activities, and interacting with citizens \r\ncan, if properly trained in what to look for and what questions \r\nto ask, be a tremendous source of intelligence for local, \r\nState, and Federal homeland security forces.\r\n However, in order to maximize the capabilities of State and \r\nlocal law enforcement officers, it is vital that we improve the \r\naccuracy and ensure the validity of what has become the de \r\nfacto means of identifying individuals in this country, their \r\ndriver's licenses. Law enforcement officials must be able to \r\nact with certainty when dealing with citizens in our \r\ncommunities. We need to be certain that they are who their \r\nidentification documents say they are and we need to be certain \r\nthat the documents themselves are not counterfeit.\r\n The effort to improve the accuracy of driver's licenses is \r\nso vital because of the simple fact that individuals with a \r\nvalid driver's license will have greater success in staying off \r\nthe radar screen of State and local law enforcement officials. \r\nAs subsequent investigations have shown, the ability of the \r\nSeptember 11 terrorists to obtain driver's licenses or State-\r\nissued identification documents greatly facilitated their \r\noperation within the United States.\r\n For example, as we all know, on September 9, a trooper from \r\nmy home State of Maryland pulled over Ziad Zamir Jarrah, one of \r\nthe terrorists on Flight 93, which crashed south of Pittsburgh, \r\nfor speeding on Interstate 95 north of Baltimore. During this \r\ntraffic stop, Jarrah produced an apparently valid driver's \r\nlicense from the State of Virginia, and as a result, the stop \r\nproceeded in typical fashion. However, if Mr. Jarrah had been \r\nunable to produce a license or if he had produced a license \r\nthat the trooper could have identified as fraudulent, then \r\nfurther investigation would have been warranted and perhaps \r\nfuture events would have taken a different course.\r\n To address this crucial issue, the International \r\nAssociation of Chiefs of Police believes that several steps \r\nmust be taken. First, certain minimum standards must be \r\nestablished that will help to ensure that information used to \r\nestablish an individual's identity at the time they apply for \r\nthe driver's license is valid and accurate and consistent from \r\nState to State.\r\n Second, agreement should be reached among the States for \r\nthe inclusion of both a unique identifier, such as a \r\nfingerprint, and anti-counterfeiting security devices in \r\ndriver's licenses.\r\n Third, States should be encouraged to link databases so \r\nthat licensing agencies and law enforcement personnel in other \r\nStates will be able to access an individual's criminal and \r\nmotor vehicle traffic violation history in order to assist in \r\nthe identification of potential criminal suspects or problem \r\ndrivers.\r\n Finally, the IACP believes that penalties for identity \r\ntheft and identity fraud should be increased.\r\n In conclusion, I would like to state that the ability of \r\nindividuals to obtain inaccurate identification documents \r\neither through fraud or forgery has been an area of vital \r\nconcern to law enforcement agencies throughout the Nation for a \r\nnumber of years. Unfortunately, it took the events of September \r\n11 to catapult this issue to the forefront of national debate. \r\nIt is the IACP's hope that action to remedy this critical \r\nsituation can be taken in a timely fashion. We look forward to \r\nworking with this Subcommittee, other Members of Congress, and \r\nour colleagues around the Nation in this effort.\r\n Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and I \r\nwould be happy to answer any questions.\r\n Senator Durbin. Thank you for your testimony. I appreciate \r\nit very much. Mr. Varn.\r\n\r\n TESTIMONY OF RICHARD J. VARN,\\1\\ CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, \r\n STATE OF IOWA, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATION\r\n\r\n Mr. Varn. Thank you, Senator Durbin and fellow panelists, \r\ninterested guests. I would like to start by saying I am \r\nrepresenting both NASCIO, which is the National Association of \r\nState Chief Information Officers, as well as NGA today.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n \\1\\ The prepared statement of Mr. Varn with attachments appears in \r\nthe Appendix on page 35.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n I need to begin by saying that neither organization has an \r\nofficial position directly on the subject of identity security \r\nor enhancing the driver's licenses or the life document \r\nsystems. NGA does not see a need for Federal action at this \r\ntime. It believes it is a State issue and the States need \r\ninitially to have an opportunity to address it.\r\n NASCIO and its members have a special interest in the \r\ninformation technology issues surrounding identity security and \r\nwant and need to play a role in coordinating and an operational \r\nrole in the design, development, and implementation of IT \r\nsolutions and systems. That said, let me point out some of the \r\nthings I think do need to be done, some of which I personally \r\nbelieve involved some Federal action. That is my own personal \r\nopinion, though.\r\n Identity security is a critical component, and I will offer \r\nmy own personal opinion separate from NGA or NASCIO's opinions.\r\n Identity security is a critical component of ensuring \r\naccuracy and preventing fraud in the granting of privileges and \r\nbenefits in many government programs and processes. Identity is \r\nlike a critical junction point in the wiring of government and \r\nthe information society. If a fault occurs and false positive \r\nor false negative identifications are made, real harm, ranging \r\nfrom financial crime, ruined reputations, exploitation of \r\nvulnerable children and adults, and violent crime can result. \r\nWithout good identity security, the trustworthy and deserving \r\ncan be denied and the dishonest and undeserving rewarded.\r\n A common point of confusion in the discussion around \r\nidentity is between the right to anonymity and the right to \r\nprivacy. Privacy laws and constitutional protections are \r\nplentiful. Anonymity analogs are scarce. One reason for this is \r\nfor most of human history, we have not been anonymous. We have \r\nlived in close-knit communities and people have known us since \r\nbirth. We have ridden on that assumption, that we knew each \r\nother, and our credit systems and our business transaction \r\nsystems have depended on that for the last 50, 60, 70 years, \r\nwhen, in fact, that system had fallen apart.\r\n The other reason anonymity is not commonly allowed is that \r\nit only works where behavior, status, age, or individually \r\ngranted rights and privileges are not at issue. You have a \r\nright to be anonymous when you pay cash or maybe when you look \r\nat public records, but not when you are seeking a license, or a \r\ngovernment benefit, writing a check, using credit, working with \r\nchildren or in a secure area, or buying protection from risk. \r\nThe people that do the transactions need to know who you are. \r\nWho they share that information with is a privacy matter. It is \r\nnot possible to be anonymous and get those rights and \r\nprivileges in most cases.\r\n The identity system on which we depend for most of our \r\ntransactions is broken and is more likely to actually enable \r\nidentity theft and fraud rather than prevent it. Sound security \r\nin the creation of authentication needs three parts: Something \r\nyou know, something you have, and something you are. We often \r\nrely on one or two of these to establish identity and extend \r\nprivileges and benefits. As a result, facts such as we heard \r\nearlier, such as Social Security number, address, and birthday, \r\nmother's maiden name, which cannot be adequately protected as \r\nsecrets, are used to create identity.\r\n It is not these facts or inability to keep them secret that \r\nis the problem. It is that we rely on them alone to establish \r\nidentity. Moreover, we have grossly inadequate methods for \r\ncreating and determining validity of the documents that \r\ncomprise the ``something you have'' component. And finally, as \r\nwas pointed out, with the exception of photos, we have not yet \r\nembraced a common and coordinated system of a biometric for \r\npresenting something you are.\r\n Our identity system is broken, therefore, because the parts \r\nare broken. We lack adequate investment, infrastructure \r\nstandards, and process in coordination and information sharing \r\namong the responsible government entities.\r\n I would like to just point out what others have said by \r\npointing out that I get on planes--our driver's license system \r\nis one of those parts that is broken--I get on planes with this \r\nidentity right here. It happens to look like a driver's \r\nlicense, but it is my State ID card. I needed no more than \r\nbeing an employee of the State of Iowa to board every plane I \r\nhave gotten on since September 11, an example of the problem we \r\nhave with the security of the driver's license system.\r\n Cyber security, homeland security, electronic commerce, \r\ncompliance with many laws such as HIPAA and this whole issue of \r\nidentity security are related and need a coordinated solution. \r\nHowever, that is not how these programs are being done or \r\naddressed. We are headed towards years of rework, retrofit, and \r\nthe integration of stacks of ID cards and ID systems unless \r\ncoordination occurs now.\r\n There is a crying need for this and this coordination could \r\ntake many forms. I have listed some of them for you in my \r\nwritten testimony, such things as interstate compacts, \r\ncommittees such as this looking at how the government spending \r\nis taking place in the agencies and in the programs that you \r\nhave already authorized and making sure that it is coordinated \r\nboth inside the Federal Government and between and among levels \r\nof government.\r\n I want to mention one other program that we are doing in \r\nIowa that might be also part of the solution. It is a \r\nrelatively simple and cheap effort to ensure that, what we call \r\nlife documents are protected from illegal duplication or \r\nmisuse. We have simply digitized all 11 million birth records \r\nfrom the State of Iowa since the 1890's. This system will allow \r\nthe creation of an index and a process to reference that single \r\nelectronic record as the real and unique record of a person's \r\nbirth and databases can reflect when that is used in other life \r\ndocument issuing processes, and persons who are the subject of \r\nthat record can find out when their birth record is being used \r\nto create identity.\r\n Finally, I would like to point out a need for coordination \r\nfor some Federal activity concerning the legal entry of people \r\ninto our country. There is a hodge-podge of systems that need \r\nto be coordinated into a single system which mirrors and is \r\nintegrated with these enhanced State and local life document \r\nsystems. The Federal Government needs to have a document that \r\nshows the beginning, the duration, the course, and the end of a \r\nlegal entrant's life into our country, regardless of whether \r\nthey are just visiting or making America their new home.\r\n The multiple Federal systems need to create a common \r\nelectronic shared equivalent of a birth and death record. That \r\ncommon electronic record can be used by all levels of \r\ngovernment in the same fashion as a normal birth and death \r\nrecord and would be the reference document for forms of \r\nidentity and extension of privileges and benefits. Such a \r\nrecord for legal entrants could include a photo, biometric, \r\nstatement and documentation of their life facts, such as name, \r\ndate of birth, and so on. Even if different cards or processes \r\nstem from this one record, we will enhance the interoperability \r\nand efficiency of issuance systems and we will prevent fraud.\r\n With that, I would conclude by saying that NASCIO, NGA, and \r\nmy department, the Information Technology Department of Iowa, \r\nthank you for the opportunity to testify today and I will be \r\nhappy to answer questions.\r\n Senator Durbin. Thanks very much, Mr. Varn. Senator Allen.\r\n\r\n TESTIMONY OF HON. BARBARA P. ALLEN,\\1\\ STATE SENATOR, EIGHTH \r\n DISTRICT, STATE OF KANSAS\r\n\r\n Ms. Allen. Thank you, Senator Durbin. I appreciate the \r\ninvitation to testify today.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n \\1\\ The prepared statement of Ms. Allen with an attachment appears \r\nin the Appendix on page 53.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n I became interested in the issue of identity theft last \r\nDecember and January when I personally became a victim of bank \r\nfraud. I will not go into the details here today, but I can say \r\nthat it was a very time consuming and frustrating and scary \r\nexperience.\r\n As I researched this issue in my own State of Kansas, I was \r\nstunned to learn how easy it is to obtain fraudulent \r\nidentification which is government issued in the form of \r\ndriver's licenses and ID cards.\r\n As we all know, reports of identity theft have increased \r\nsignificantly and exponentially in the United States and, of \r\ncourse, in my State of Kansas, in the last several years. \r\nToday, I regret to say that Kansas is one of the easiest States \r\nin the country in which to obtain false identification and to \r\nsteal someone's identity.\r\n Kansas is one of only a few remaining States that will \r\nprovide any applicant an immediately-issued driver's license or \r\nID card with no requirement of a Social Security number or any \r\nbiometric information. We have no security measures in place to \r\nprotect Kansans to ensure that the person applying for a \r\ndriver's license or a non-driver's ID card really is that \r\nperson. A simple photograph yields an instant permanent piece \r\nof government-issued identification.\r\n Kansas currently requires a photograph, but no Social \r\nSecurity number or fingerprint, to get a driver's license or an \r\nID card. The bill which I cosponsored at the beginning of the \r\n2002 legislative session would amend State law so that all \r\napplicants for driver's licenses or ID cards would be required \r\nto submit their Social Security number and a biometric \r\nidentifier, the most common of which would be a thumbprint, to \r\nobtain identification. Applicants would then receive a \r\ntemporary license or ID card, and only after verification of \r\nthe applicant's identity would a permanent piece of \r\nidentification be issued.\r\n In addition, today in Kansas you can receive an ID card and \r\na driver's license concurrently and we would no longer allow \r\nthat to happen. That would be prohibited.\r\n The District Attorney's Office in Johnson County, which is \r\npart of the Kansas City metropolitan area and also near my \r\nSenatorial district, reports that cases of identity theft \r\ndouble every year. Identity theft in the City of Overland Park, \r\nwhere I live, have increased 100 percent in each of the last 2 \r\nyears. In my county alone, this crime causes over $1 million \r\nannually in losses to retailers, credit card companies, and \r\nbanks. These losses are passed on to the consumer in the form \r\nof higher costs for products and services.\r\n Of course, the financial implications of identity theft are \r\nsubstantial, but they pale in comparison to the damage that can \r\nbe done, including loss of life, when criminals steal our \r\nidentities and use them for evil purposes on a broader scale.\r\n I have attached to my testimony today an article by \r\nGovernor Tom Ridge, Director of the Office of Homeland \r\nSecurity, who is encouraging governors and other State \r\nofficials to take steps to improve the security and \r\nauthenticity of driver's licenses. Governor Ridge recently \r\nurged governors attending a National Governors Association \r\nmeeting to draft model legislation setting standards for more \r\nsecure licensing procedures. By coming up with their own \r\nprocedures, Governor Ridge said the governors would avoid \r\nhaving standards forced on them by Congress.\r\n Driver's licenses are much more than a license to drive. \r\nThey allow us to open bank accounts, to cash checks, to write \r\nmerchants checks, and to step onto airplanes. They are the most \r\nwidely used and accepted domestic document to verify a person's \r\nidentity, but they are not reliable and they will not be \r\nreliable until we strengthen the verification identity process \r\nbefore a license is issued.\r\n As Americans, we have two choices. We can leave the current \r\nidentification system as it is and risk the personal and \r\nfinancial security of private citizens, the finances of the \r\nbusiness community, and the lives of fellow Americans, or we \r\ncan improve the system.\r\n Going through this experience in my own State of trying to \r\nget legislation passed which would strengthen the \r\nidentification system for licenses and ID cards, I found that \r\nthere are some who argue a personal identification system is, \r\nin fact, an evasion of privacy or a limitation on personal \r\nfreedom, but only those who have something to hide will lose \r\nfrom providing proof positive that they are who they say they \r\nare. Identity cards, and that, in fact, is what driver's \r\nlicenses are today, should be as close to foolproof as \r\ntechnology can make them to protect us.\r\n S. 559 is not about invading Kansans' privacy. It is about \r\npreserving Kansans' privacy and protecting Kansans' security.\r\n Senator Durbin, you mentioned the nationwide effort to \r\ncoordinate activities and I want to comment about a question \r\nyou raised in our invitation letter, which was what should the \r\nrole of the Federal Government be in enhancing the reliability \r\nand security of the driver's license system. Based on my own \r\nexperience in Kansas, I feel quite strongly that a national ID \r\ncard is not the answer. Perhaps the role of the Federal \r\nGovernment should be two things. First of all, to set standards \r\nfor more secure licensing procedures, and second, to offer \r\nfinancial incentives to States that take every step possible to \r\nensure that government-issued identification is authentic.\r\n Personally, I would welcome incentives from the Federal \r\nGovernment to help convince legislators in my State it is \r\ncritical we improve the security and authenticity of driver's \r\nlicenses in Kansas. Many of them still do not appreciate the \r\nmagnitude of this threat to our personal safety and financial \r\nsecurity.\r\n I just wanted to comment in closing that this bill passed \r\nthe Kansas Senate in March on a vote of 25 to 15. It passed out \r\nof the House Judiciary Committee and it is currently lingering \r\nin the House of Representatives, but I am still hopeful that we \r\nwill get it passed this session. Thank you.\r\n Senator Durbin. Thank you. Ms. Serian.\r\n\r\n TESTIMONY OF BETTY L. SERIAN,\\1\\ DEPUTY SECRETARY FOR SAFETY \r\n ADMINISTRATION, PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, ON \r\n BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF MOTOR VEHICLE \r\n ADMINISTRATORS\r\n\r\n Ms. Serian. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. I am Betty Serian, \r\nVice Chair of the American Association of Motor Vehicle \r\nAdministrators, AAMVA. I want to thank you for the opportunity \r\nto speak this morning.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n \\1\\ The prepared statement of Ms. Serian appears in the Appendix on \r\npage 58.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n AAMVA is a nonprofit association representing DMV \r\nadministrators and law enforcement officials throughout the \r\nU.S. and Canada. And let me tell you about a few Americans.\r\n Larry and Rita Beller, Edward and Alice Ramaeker spent \r\ntheir golden years traveling across the country. They were \r\nkilled on a New Mexico highway by a repeat DUI offender. The \r\ndriver, holding eight prior convictions from different States, \r\nwas under the influence of alcohol and plowed head-on into the \r\nretirees' car.\r\n Emeke Moneme, an Ohio resident, had his wallet stolen at \r\nthe local gym. Within weeks of having his license disappear, \r\nEmeke discovered an identity thief had opened 13 fraudulent \r\naccounts in his name totaling $30,000 in bad credit debt. It \r\ntook him months to straighten out his life.\r\n Sara Clark, a schoolteacher, was killed after her flight \r\nwas overtaken by terrorists and crashed into the Pentagon. \r\nTerrorists boarded her flight using a fraudulently obtained \r\ndriver's license. Sara Clark shared this sad fate with more \r\nthan 3,000 other Americans on September 11.\r\n Larry and Rita Beller, Edward and Alice Ramaeker shared a \r\nlist of DUI fatalities with more than 16,000 Americans every \r\nsingle year. And Emeke Moneme shares identity theft with \r\nhundreds of thousands of American victims.\r\n A common thread to these tragedies? The driver's license. \r\nThe driver's license has become the most requested form of ID \r\nin the United States and Canada. Financial institutions require \r\nit to open an account. Retailers ask for it when you write a \r\ncheck. And the airlines demand it of you before you board a \r\nplane.\r\n The United States has more than 200 different valid forms \r\nof driver's licenses and ID cards in circulation. Each State \r\nand D.C. has different practices for issuing licenses. \r\nIndividuals looking to undermine the system, whether it be a \r\nterrorist, a drunk driver, or an identity thief, shop around \r\nfor licenses in those States that have become the weakest link.\r\n In addition, the lack of standard security features on a \r\ndriver's license allows individuals to exploit this system. \r\nThis makes it difficult for law enforcement to verify the \r\nvalidity of a license from another State, not to mention the \r\nidentity of the person who is holding that license. The \r\nsituation is worsened by the availability of counterfeit \r\ndriver's licenses and fraudulent documents, breeder documents, \r\nover the net and in underground markets.\r\n We already maintain driving records. However, the country \r\nneeds more effective tools to manage them. Problem drivers who \r\nobtain multiple licenses spread their bad driving history from \r\nState to State. They avoid detection, they avoid penalties, \r\nthey avoid punishment. We need a system, such as the proposed \r\nDriver Record Information Verification System, to keep bad \r\ndrivers off the road and save the lives of those who \r\nresponsibly use the privilege to drive.\r\n DMVs already exchange driver history on commercial drivers \r\nthrough the 1986 federally mandated Commercial Driver License \r\nInformation System, also known as CDLIS, and within a 4-year \r\nperiod, CDLIS kept 871,000 potentially dangerous commercial \r\ndrivers off the road.\r\n The American public wants a more secure license and there \r\nare five ways we believe that Congress can help. Support \r\nminimum standards and requirements for each State that each \r\nState must adopt when issuing a license. Help DMVs identify \r\nfraudulent documents. Support an interstate network for \r\nconfirming a person's driving history. Impose stiffer penalties \r\non those committing fraudulent acts. And provide funding to \r\nmake this happen, funding so that States can help ensure a \r\nsafer America.\r\n Based on a recent survey, the public expects you to help. \r\nEighty-three percent of the respondents use their driver's \r\nlicenses for purposes other than driving. Sixty-five percent \r\nthink it is too easy to obtain a fake license or ID card. \r\nSeventy-seven percent of the respondents favor Congressional \r\naction to modify the licensing process and ID security.\r\n For years, AAMVA has worked to strengthen the driver \r\nlicensing process. Following September 11, Americans quickly \r\nlearned how easily terrorists obtain driver's licenses. What is \r\nsaddening is that it took this catastrophic event to heighten \r\nAmerica's awareness of the importance of secure ID credentials.\r\n We want to ensure that every driver has one license and one \r\ndriving history and Congress can make that happen. When you can \r\nverify identity, we are certainly one step closer to preventing \r\nfraud, protecting privacy, and saving lives. Thank you very \r\nmuch for the opportunity to testify.\r\n Senator Durbin. Thank you, Ms. Serian. Mr. Goleman.\r\n\r\n TESTIMONY OF BARRY GOLEMAN,\\1\\ VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC SECTOR, \r\n AMERICAN MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS, INC.\r\n\r\n Mr. Goleman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership \r\nand the opportunity to be here today.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n \\1\\ The prepared statement of Mr. Goleman with an attachment \r\nappears in the Appendix on page 66.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n Senator Durbin, we at AMS believe that this Subcommittee is \r\non exactly the right track by holding this hearing and \r\nadvocating the development of a more secure driver's license. \r\nWe believe technology can advance identification security while \r\npreserving our personal freedoms.\r\n I work for American Management Systems of Fairfax, \r\nVirginia, and I have been involved for nearly 30 years at the \r\nState and Federal level in how licenses are issued and in the \r\ninformation systems that support that process. I started as a \r\ndriver's license examiner in the State of California issuing \r\nlicenses. I ran a motor vehicle office and I worked to \r\nimplement the one standard Federal license program that we have \r\ntoday, the commercial driver's license. Before I came to AMS, I \r\nworked at AAMVA, where I built and operated the information \r\nsystems for the exchange of commercial driver information. And \r\nI know from personal experience that the system can be \r\nattacked.\r\n When I was an examiner, I was presented with counterfeit \r\ndocuments to obtain a license. I stopped people from stealing \r\nidentities for the purpose of cashing stolen checks. I was even \r\noffered bribes of cash or sexual favors in exchange for issuing \r\ndriver's license. For the record, I refused those attempted \r\nbribes. [Laughter.]\r\n But unfortunately, not all employees do.\r\n As has been described by others on the panel here today, we \r\nhave learned that in the aftermath of September 11 that \r\nterrorists obtained multiple driver's licenses and ID documents \r\nfrom State motor vehicle agencies with ease, some using \r\nfraudulent documents or bribes.\r\n Despite this security breach, there is encouraging news. \r\nThis is a problem we can fix. With technology that exists \r\ntoday, we can stop the fraud and counterfeiting of State \r\nlicenses. A model for the kind of Federal and State cooperative \r\neffort that is needed is a development of the licensing program \r\nto meet the requirements of the Commercial Motor Vehicle Safety \r\nAct.\r\n In helping to develop the information systems for this \r\nlicensing program, I have seen firsthand how State and Federal \r\nagencies can work together. With Federal funding made \r\navailable, State licensing experts can adopt and implement new \r\nstrict Federal standards. Do not let detractors tell you this \r\ncannot be done.\r\n Your leadership and that of the others on this \r\nSubcommittee, however, is going to be necessary to make this \r\nhappen. It is imperative that we improve the integrity of the \r\ndriver's license to enable it to live up to its reputation as a \r\nreliable personal identification document. The reality is that, \r\ntoday, the license is the trusted de facto identification used \r\nby Americans to prove their identity within our borders. \r\nRetailers use them for cashing checks, banks for account \r\nverification, and airports for access to secure areas.\r\n Our newly revealed security vulnerabilities demonstrate how \r\nimportant it is that the next generation of ID documents adhere \r\nto standardized security features and use the highest level of \r\ntamper-resistant technologies available. Biometrics, such as \r\nfingerprints or facial recognition, for example, can complete a \r\npositive one-to-one authentication of an individual to the \r\ncard. Smart cards will also make the driver's license into a \r\ncarrier of important data, including the biometric identifier \r\non the card itself.\r\n Used without improved verification techniques, however, \r\nthese cards will be useless as secure, reliable forms of \r\nidentification. I urge you to consider new technologies to \r\nensure that people with counterfeit or false IDs will not be \r\nable to obtain better, more secure licenses.\r\n The first step is a thorough verification of the \r\nindividual's identity before he or she enters into the system. \r\nTo accomplish this, State examiners must have access to the \r\ndata that backs up the documents, such as birth records and \r\nimmigration data. Today's web services technologies can verify \r\ninformation in multiple databases while protecting the personal \r\ninformation from unintended disclosure.\r\n At AMS, we are currently working with Federal and State \r\nagencies in an effort to improve the basis for making \r\nidentification decisions. Without improved identity \r\nverification, it is clear that we will not be able to achieve \r\nour goal of a more trustworthy document.\r\n I would also like to draw your attention to the importance \r\nof preventing or deterring employee fraud. Just as I was \r\noccasionally offered bribes, today's examiners have their \r\nintegrity challenged when criminals seek any path to obtain a \r\nvalid State license. To detect and deter fraud, licensing \r\nadministrators must rely on technology for internal auditing \r\nand business intelligence tools. These are tools commonly used \r\ntoday in the commercial world.\r\n For example, States issue commercial licenses today \r\naccording to Federal standards and it takes about 45 minutes to \r\ncomplete a required driving test. As a supervisor, I would be \r\nconcerned about an examiner who issued a commercial license in \r\nonly 10 minutes and I would want to investigate that \r\ntransaction, but I cannot do that unless I have the data.\r\n The steps I have outlined are not only necessary, but \r\nachievable with Federal, State, and private cooperation. With \r\nyour leadership, we can achieve success in improving our \r\nidentification systems and homeland security. I thank you and I \r\nlook forward to your questions.\r\n Senator Durbin. Thank you very much, Mr. Goleman. Mr. \r\nJansen.\r\n\r\nTESTIMONY OF J. BRADLEY JANSEN,\\1\\ DEPUTY DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR \r\n TECHNOLOGY POLICY, FREE CONGRESS FOUNDATION\r\n\r\n Mr. Jansen. Mr. Chairman, thank you for having us here. I \r\nwanted to say that there are a lot of debates on this in the \r\npublic fora and I have met with some of the other people in \r\nthis room today. A lot of the other fora are more prone to \r\nsound bites and do not necessarily advance a solution to the \r\ndebate and I congratulate you for bringing together a lot of \r\npeople who do offer positive solutions. All of the groups that \r\nI know of here and from what I have heard from the other \r\ntestimony are all trying to reach actual solutions, and there \r\nis not a simple one-size-fits-all approach that is going to fix \r\nthis and I look forward to working with many of the other \r\npeople here in the future.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n \\1\\ The prepared statement of Mr. Jansen appears in the Appendix on \r\npage 80.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n The Free Congress Foundation works with Eagle Forum, the \r\nElectronic Privacy Information Center, and the ACLU to head a \r\nloose ad hoc coalition of groups that are opposed to a national \r\nID system. I would like to, with that in mind, indulge the \r\nChairman to include a letter that EPIC asked me to have \r\nincluded in the record.\\1\\\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n \\1\\ The letter submitted by Mr. Jansen for EPIC with an attachment \r\nappears in the Appendix on page 124.\r\n---------------------------------------------------------------------------\r\n Senator Durbin. Without objection.\r\n Mr. Jansen. I would like to highlight some of our concerns \r\nbriefly and then go into some other comments. The coalition \r\nthat we are working with put a letter to President Bush on the \r\nAAMVA proposal. We oppose Federal funding for that proposal for \r\na variety of reasons, the first of which is that a national ID \r\nsystem would not prevent terrorism. An ID card is only as good \r\nas the information that establishes the identity in the first \r\nplace and there are other solutions that need to be done.\r\n A national ID would depend on a massive bureaucracy that \r\nwould limit our basic freedoms. There are problems there in \r\nterms of just what the identification is. It is not just \r\nnecessarily an identification system, but it could easily \r\nbecome a data collection system and there are broader and \r\ncomplex issues that need to be addressed there which could also \r\ncontribute to identity fraud.\r\n A national ID system would be expensive and it would direct \r\nresources away from more effective counterterrorism measures. \r\nThere have been a lot of varying estimates on this proposal and \r\nthere are lots of other proposals that might be done. We do not \r\nknow what the costs and benefits of these are and we need not \r\nrush into some kind of a solution for that.\r\n Our organizations believe very strongly that a national ID \r\nsystem would contribute to identity fraud and make it much more \r\ndifficult to remedy instances when victims have suffered \r\nidentity theft.\r\n Americans have consistently rejected the idea of a national \r\nID and limited the uses of data collected by the government. In \r\nthe 1970's, both Presidents Nixon and Carter rejected the use \r\nof Social Security numbers as a uniform identifier because of \r\nprivacy concerns. A national ID would be one-stop shopping for \r\nperpetrators of identity theft, who usually use Social Security \r\nnumbers and birth certificates for false IDs.\r\n Even with the biometric identifier, such as a fingerprint, \r\non a national ID, there is no guarantee that individuals will \r\nnot be identified or, more importantly, misidentified in error. \r\nThe accuracy of biometric technology varies, depending on the \r\ntype and implementation, and it would be more difficult to \r\nremedy identity fraud when a thief has a national ID card with \r\nyour name on it but his biometric information.\r\n As an example of some of the problems that might happen if \r\nwe were to standardize some of these issues, the letter that I \r\nreceived from the Subcommittee here asking me to testify had my \r\nname spelled differently in the two different times that it \r\nmentioned my name. Again, I am sure there was no intent to \r\ndefraud or anything else, but transposition errors can happen.\r\n Senator Durbin. It was a test. [Laughter.]\r\n Mr. Jansen. A national ID could require all Americans to \r\ncarry an internal passport at all times. That would compromise \r\nour privacy, limit our freedom, and expose us to unfair \r\ndiscrimination based on national origin or religion. The \r\nnational driver's license right now is not used for many of \r\nthese purposes, but other speakers here are right that it is \r\nused more broadly, and the more it is linked with other \r\npurposes, the more it could be used and abused for other \r\npurposes.\r\n If it is linked with, for example, our educational \r\nbackgrounds, it will not be difficult to determine that I went \r\nto a parochial grade school and Jesuit high school that began \r\nwith the word ``Saint'' and determine, therefore, that I am \r\nCatholic. We need to be very careful what a national \r\nidentification system is that we are talking about and also how \r\nit might be linked and used with data collection.\r\n In addition to the concerns that we raised in this \r\ncoalition letter, the Federal Government already has a lot of \r\nauthority to address some of these concerns. Richard Clarke, \r\nwho is the chairman of the new Critical Infrastructure \r\nProtection Board, was quoted in Wired magazine recently as \r\nsaying, ``On the government systems side, we already have a lot \r\nof authority to use standards and enforce them. We have never \r\ndone that.''\r\n What we need to do is for the Federal Government to focus \r\non systems that are directly affected by the Federal \r\nGovernment. Another speaker here today made reference to a use \r\nof a mailing that helped perpetuate identity fraud. The post \r\noffice has a national change of address system that needs to be \r\naddressed for uses for identity fraud.\r\n We also need to be concerned that standardizing these \r\nprocedures across the States would truncate the discovery \r\nprocess during a period of great technological change. Some \r\nStates might adopt different types of biometric identification \r\nor different types of systems, such as the one advocated by \r\nSenator Allen, that might be a best system. Even if we adopt \r\nwhat might be an overall best system now, there is no guarantee \r\nthat that system would always be the best system, and by \r\nactually having different States adopting different standards, \r\nwe have a way of comparing and contrasting which systems work \r\nand which ones do not and adopting the better systems more \r\nbroadly.\r\n In conclusion, I would just like to applaud the \r\nSubcommittee for taking an active role in such an important \r\nquestion. The development of new technologies, including \r\nbiometrics, might be able to improve the quality of \r\nidentification systems, but their capability should not be \r\nexaggerated. The focus of the Federal Government at this point \r\nshould be to address the inadequacies of their own systems, \r\nsuch as the passport and INS systems, and again, I thank you \r\nagain for this opportunity.\r\n Senator Durbin. Thank you, Mr. Jansen.\r\n Mr. Jansen, let me ask you, you have undoubtedly flown \r\nsince September 11 and have been asked to produce a photo ID at \r\nan airport, is that correct?\r\n Mr. Jansen. Yes.\r\n Senator Durbin. Do you have problems with that? Do you \r\nobject to that?\r\n Mr. Jansen. To producing ID or a driver's license to \r\ngetting on an airplane?\r\n Senator Durbin. Right.\r\n Mr. Jansen. No, not at all.\r\n Senator Durbin. Why?\r\n Mr. Jansen. I think that it is a good protection for \r\nAmericans and it is also a private commercial enterprise, and \r\nif I choose not to do that, I do not have to, as opposed to a \r\ngovernment ID or a government-imposed system where citizens do \r\nnot have that choice.\r\n Senator Durbin. You are getting way ahead of me here. The \r\nairports, of course, now are under Federal jurisdiction and the \r\nstandards that are being used at those airports are subject to \r\nFederal rule, and one of those standards which is ubiquitous is \r\nthe presentation of a photo ID. I think most people would \r\nunderstand that that is the entry into the system, and as you \r\nsaid, that is not an unreasonable request that you verify that \r\nyou are, in fact, Bradley Jansen with one ``s'' and that you \r\nare the person who purchased the ticket. So if that standard of \r\nproof is reasonable, what is wrong with making certain that it \r\nis accurate?\r\n Mr. Jansen. There is nothing wrong with making sure that \r\nthat system is accurate, and again, I applaud the Subcommittee \r\nfor addressing these in a much more constructive fora than we \r\nhave debated these in the past.\r\n Having a photo ID does not necessarily require a specific \r\nidentification card. I have traveled using my passport as well \r\nas my driver's license. For example, in the situation of the \r\nterrorists, one of the terrorists used a passport that was \r\nstolen, and when the initial list of alleged hijackers came \r\nout, it included the name of someone who had had his passport \r\nstolen, had reported it stolen, and the State Department itself \r\ndid not keep a record of passports that were stolen.\r\n Shunting responsibility to the States on this, I think \r\nwould risk absolving the Federal Government for their \r\nresponsibility in maintaining the accuracy and identification \r\nof the systems for which they should be responsible.\r\n Senator Durbin. That is a good point, and let me assure you \r\nthat no matter what we say about driver's licenses and State \r\nIDs or other forms of identification, it is not at the expense \r\nof the Federal Government meeting its own obligation, whether \r\nit is through the passports or whatever source of Federal ID is \r\nused.\r\n But I want to make it clear that this hearing is about \r\nState-issued driver's licenses, not a national ID, that the \r\nStates will still have the authority to issue and revoke those \r\ndriver's licenses. There is nothing in legislation we are \r\nconsidering that would take that authority away from the \r\nStates. What I am trying to explore here is ways to make \r\ncertain that on a national basis, we have an accurate, reliable \r\nstandard so that if I present an Illinois driver's license and \r\nSenator Allen presents a Kansas driver's license at Reagan \r\nNational Airport, that they know going in that it is more \r\nlikely that they are accurate. That is all that we are seeking \r\nto do here and it is not to establish a national ID, which \r\nbrings a whole range of other issues into this discussion.\r\n Mr. Wern, let me start with you, if I might, in my \r\nquestions. Senator Allen has been a victim of identity theft \r\nand so have I, about 2 years ago. I was lucky. I did not go \r\nthrough what you did, but I got a phone call at my home in \r\nSpringfield, Illinois, one day. My wife was nearby and they \r\nsaid, ``Well, Durbin, we finally caught up with you.'' And I \r\nsaid, ``What are you talking about?''\r\n They said, ``Did you think you could get by making charges \r\nat Home Depot in Denver, Colorado, and not paying thousands of \r\ndollars that you owe us?'' I said, ``I have never been to a \r\nHome Depot in Denver, Colorado.'' ``Oh, yes, you have. Is this \r\nyour Social Security number?'' They gave it to me. ``And this \r\nis your mother's name?'' ``Yes.'' ``Well, you had a Home Depot \r\ncredit card and these charges were made and you have ducked it \r\nand we have finally caught you here in Springfield.''\r\n In fact, someone had stolen my identity and it took me, I \r\nthink, about 2 months to finally go through the credit system \r\nand clear it up. And to their credit, no pun intended, it \r\nworked, and when it was all said and done, my record was \r\ncleared.\r\n You went through a much longer, more involved, and \r\nobviously painful process, but ultimately, the person who did \r\nthis was apprehended, is that correct?\r\n Mr. Wern. Yes.\r\n Senator Durbin. How did that happen, do you know?\r\n Mr. Wern. It was soon after he got a DUI from an Ohio State \r\npatrolman and was able to give my information and basically \r\nwalk scot free from that. I think that the vigilance that they \r\ntook after that event, both the Mansfield Division of the Ohio \r\nState Patrol and the local Mansfield Police Department, they \r\nreally focused their energies on catching this guy because he \r\nbasically crossed the line.\r\n That is not to say that other law enforcement was resistant \r\nto following up on these things. It is just hard to catch \r\nsomebody unless they really do something that bold and visible. \r\nMost of the time, these things happen over the phone, they \r\nhappen on the Internet, and it is just hard to track a person \r\ndown.\r\n Senator Durbin. A curious situation, though, that he would \r\nbe pulled over for a traffic offense, not have a driver's \r\nlicense, and be able to talk his way out of it.\r\n Mr. Wern. Yes.\r\n Senator Durbin. That is what happened?\r\n Mr. Wern. That is what happened.\r\n Senator Durbin. Did you have the assistance of any State or \r\nFederal agencies in this effort to clear up your identity \r\ntheft?\r\n Mr. Wern. Aside from law enforcement, there were two \r\ninvestigators working on the case. I contacted the FTC, which \r\nhas jurisdiction over identity theft cases. Now, at least from \r\na research perspective, they do gather data. I also contacted \r\nthe Secret Service and the post office, because a lot of what \r\nhe was doing would be considered mail fraud.\r\n The agencies were responsive, but I ultimately came to the \r\ndecision that this is the kind of problem that I can better \r\ndeal with myself. Their response was, well, send us everything \r\nyou have. You send them everything you have and it is very hard \r\nfrom their perspective, sitting in an office far away, to \r\nreally approach it from a granular level and talk to the \r\ncreditors and track the person down.\r\n And also, there has to be thresholds. There are thousands \r\nof these cases out there, and at the time when I contacted \r\nthose agencies, it was at the beginning stage and I do not \r\nthink that the numbers were quite high enough nor the incidents \r\nserious enough. Those agencies have to prioritize their time.\r\n But I think I probably could have looked to those agencies \r\nmore. I think, in retrospect, I probably could have benefited \r\nmore from their resources, but it became routine. I learned how \r\nto deal with it and I tackled it, I guess, in my own way.\r\n Senator Durbin. And as you said, as a lawyer, you know how \r\nto write a forceful letter.\r\n Mr. Wern. Yes.\r\n Senator Durbin. Chief Viverette, have you worked the \r\nHighway Patrol for the State of Maryland, or at least enforced \r\ntraffic?\r\n Chief Viverette. Within my community, yes, sir.\r\n Senator Durbin. And so when someone is pulled over and \r\npresents a driver's license, which is the first thing that you \r\nare asked for, what is normal in terms of verification at the \r\nsite of the stop or the arrest when it comes to that driver's \r\nlicense?\r\n Chief Viverette. Sir, it is normal for us to use that \r\ndocument fair on its face unless we have a computer available \r\nto us where we can check that documentation. It may be that the \r\ncomputer is down and we have to believe that what we receive is \r\nfair on its face and write the citation.\r\n Senator Durbin. If the computer is working, what can you \r\nlearn?\r\n Chief Viverette. Well, we can learn more about that \r\nindividual and ask additional questions. Sometimes we will ask \r\nfor a registration and we can compare the information. But it \r\nis not unusual to find tickets in a stolen vehicle where \r\nsomeone has provided false information. The car is stolen and \r\nthe tickets are left in the car as the culprit leaves the \r\nvehicle behind.\r\n Senator Durbin. But you have a computer system that links \r\nyou to the Maryland State Police, is that how it works?\r\n Chief Viverette. That is correct, sir. Not all the cars \r\nhave computers, just the fortunate agencies that can afford \r\nthem. You can run them through communications, but sometimes \r\nair traffic and a busy night precludes that, or the computer \r\nmay be down, or you just get very specific information that the \r\nperson is not suspended.\r\n Senator Durbin. Ms. Serian, let us talk about the system \r\nnow. Assume that Chief Viverette has pulled someone over and \r\ngone into the State computer system to get some more \r\ninformation to see if that driver's license is valid. Does \r\nthat, for example, if she picks someone's license from the \r\nState of Pennsylvania, does her Maryland system check with the \r\nState of Pennsylvania at that point?\r\n Ms. Serian. Yes. I believe there is a nationwide system \r\nthat can check on the driver's status of records through the \r\nState police systems. Ideally, in police officers' cars in any \r\nState, eventually, you should be able to pull up the photo so \r\nthat would tell you then if that really is the person or is \r\nnot. But once again, photos are not even commonplace on all \r\nlicenses and the technology has not--it is not available, I \r\nguess I should say. It is advanced, but not available \r\neverywhere.\r\n So yes, there are communication links that can allow those \r\nthings to happen, and perhaps Mr. Wern's record would have been \r\nflagged. But in this case, it probably was not. In the case \r\nwhen it would be flagged, the local or State police officer \r\nwould know that this is a potential fraud issue here.\r\n Senator Durbin. But the communication between States is \r\ncritical in the world of interstate commerce.\r\n Ms. Serian. The communication between States is very \r\ncritical, especially, Senator, between DMVs and driver \r\nlicensing organizations. We right now have a critical \r\ncommunication in terms of information for the commercial \r\ndrivers. The Commercial Driver Licensing Information System \r\nprovides not only a status, but also the driving histories that \r\ncan be transferred from State to State.\r\n That is a very good system, and that is why the AAMVA \r\nproposal also calls for a system that includes the Drivers \r\nRecord Information Verification System so that driving records \r\nand the information that surrounds that driver or ID card \r\nholder can be transferred from State to State. That will, \r\nindeed, help local law enforcement officials.\r\n Senator Durbin. Of course, some of the things that we are \r\nin the process of putting into a piece of legislation include \r\ntrying to make certain that the issuance of the driver's \r\nlicense in the first instance is valid, that the person does \r\nprove their identity going in.\r\n I was recently interviewed by one of the television \r\nnetworks. They sent a reporter to the streets of Los Angeles \r\nwith $150. It took her 2 hours to come up with something that \r\nlooked like a driver's license, and those of us who walk \r\nthrough airports know how closely those licenses are examined. \r\nPeople look at them quickly and off they go. I think it would \r\nbe easy to counterfeit them under the current circumstances.\r\n There has been talk here about a smart card, about more \r\ninformation and transfer. The idea, I guess, is if you can \r\nswipe a credit card and in a hurry determine whether or not \r\nthere is any credit to be issued, the same thing could be true \r\nfor driver's licenses in the future, is that correct?\r\n Ms. Serian. Yes, it is. However, I would say that right \r\nnow, we need to really focus on improving the driver licensing \r\ndocument as the product that needs improvement. What States may \r\nwish to do in the future are taking a driver's license and \r\nmaking it other things, including health care benefits, those \r\ntypes of things. Many States are researching those \r\npossibilities right now. But that really needs to be a State-\r\nto-State decision.\r\n What we have is a system that is broken and a product that \r\nis not very reliable. So I would really encourage the \r\nSubcommittee to stay focused on improving the driver's license.\r\n For example, this is not a valid Pennsylvania driver's \r\nlicense. I know it. It is a counterfeit. But it would be very \r\ndifficult, and it is very difficult for the 16,000 police \r\norganizations throughout the country, or in California, as you \r\nmentioned, to know if that is a valid license or not. That is \r\nwhy minimum standards are an important thing to consider.\r\n Senator Durbin. Let me ask you this, Mr. Varn, because I \r\nthought you made some very important philosophical distinctions \r\nabout anonymity and when you surrender it in our society. In \r\nthe National Governors Association, how far along are you in \r\ndiscussing this issue?\r\n Mr. Varn. Not very far along, Senator. I would say the \r\ngovernors are at the beginning of discussing this issue. The \r\ntechnologists are a little further along. NASCIO has been \r\nlooking at this issue of identity security for some time and \r\nyou will find a number of efforts in different States to \r\nimprove identity security, but I would say the governors just \r\nstarted to examine it.\r\n Senator Durbin. In fairness, we are just starting to work \r\non this bill, so I am not being critical of your lack of \r\neffort, but I think when we look at what has happened in the 7 \r\nmonths or so since September 11, we now realize this is going \r\nto be the coin of the realm in America. You are going to have \r\nto produce a photo ID, and the question is, is it reliable and \r\nis it accurate?\r\n Senator Allen, in the State of Kansas, you have gone \r\nthrough this experience. What kind of political resistance have \r\nyou run into in terms of making your process a little more \r\naccurate?\r\n Ms. Allen. The issue has been the issue of loss of privacy \r\nand loss of personal freedom, and I guess it just depends on \r\nyour perspective on the issue, but to me, we are protecting \r\nprivacy and protecting security and it is really those people \r\nwho have something to hide who do not want to verify their \r\nidentity. Those people who do not have anything to hide, I \r\nthink are happy to provide whatever means are necessary to \r\nprove their identification.\r\n Senator Durbin. I guess the privacy issue is the most \r\nimportant part of this conversation. How far can or should \r\ngovernment go in asking questions? As Mr. Varn mentioned, when \r\nyou walk in and say, ``I want to drive a car in this State,'' \r\nyou have basically said, ``I am part of your system now. What \r\nare the standards you use in your system? Do I have to take a \r\ntest, have my photo taken, a thumbprint?'' Whatever it happens \r\nto be, I have really voluntarily submitted myself to a system \r\nthat has been established in the State.\r\n I want to make it clear for the record that what we are \r\ntrying to establish here in this legislation are the basic \r\nminimum standards of identification. Each State can then decide \r\nwhere they want to go in terms of additional information, and \r\nthat is something that will be debated in Kansas or Illinois or \r\nPennsylvania, as to what other information might be included in \r\nthat card. But when Chief Viverette and her officers with the \r\nInternational Association of Chiefs of Police stop someone \r\nacross America, there ought to be some basic standards that \r\nthey can look to and say, we know that this is a valid \r\nPennsylvania driver's license and this one is not because there \r\nare certain elements we are going to look for that are common \r\nto each and every one of them.\r\n I might also add, it is interesting, if you would go to the \r\nCity of Chicago on virtually any weekday morning, just south of \r\nWacker Drive, you will see hundreds of people standing on the \r\nsidewalk outside of an office building. They are trying to get \r\ninto the Mexican consulate because the country of Mexico is now \r\nissuing a card called a matricula and the matricula is a \r\nnational ID card in Mexico, and these Mexicans in the United \r\nStates are anxious to get it because with that card, they can \r\nget into the financial system in our country. They can open \r\nbank accounts and do other things.\r\n The standard of proof for those cards is far beyond any \r\ndriver's license that I have seen in the United States. They \r\nhave to produce original copies and certified copies of birth \r\ndocuments, a copy of a driver's license, for example, from \r\nMexico, local identification as well. It is a very high \r\nstandard which is being used.\r\n And it is interesting that we are saying to people from \r\nother countries in our Nation, you are held to this high \r\nstandard, but yet for those within our Nation, we do not seem \r\nto establish the same standard of proof in terms of what we can \r\nachieve.\r\n Mr. Goleman, let me ask you about the technology. You have \r\ntalked about that for a second. How expensive is this? Where is \r\nthis going to take us in terms of what it will cost to make \r\nthese cards less easy to counterfeit?\r\n Mr. Goleman. The card production itself, States probably \r\nspend today in the neighborhood of about $1 per card to produce \r\nthe current type of driver's license. Actually, Ms. Serian can \r\nprobably tell you more accurately what she pays in \r\nPennsylvania. But I would estimate that card production costs \r\nwould probably go up substantially, up into the $2, $3, $4, $5 \r\nrange in order to put much higher security features on the \r\nlicenses, or if you go to smart cards or imbed biometric \r\ntechnology into the card itself. It is still not a high cost, \r\nmore similar to the costs that Europeans pay for identity \r\ncards.\r\n Senator Durbin. The range of $1 to $5, you think, is a \r\nreasonable range for our conversation here in terms of current \r\ncost versus additional expense to make them more reliable?\r\n Mr. Goleman. Yes, I do. On a mass production basis, I think \r\nthat the costs would be that.\r\n Senator Durbin. Senator Allen, did you want to comment on \r\nthat?\r\n Ms. Allen. Well, I did. In our bill, we originally doubled \r\nthe fees for everything to cover the costs of implementation \r\nand there was a lot of resistance to that. So what we ended up \r\ndoing was amending the bill and we just raised the photo fee by \r\n$1, from $2 to $3, and we estimated that that would cover the \r\ncost of implementing even the biometric piece. So it is really \r\nnot a big increase.\r\n Senator Durbin. That takes that argument to a different \r\nlevel.\r\n Let me ask you about the other question, about the use of \r\ndatabases by the States in issuance of driver's licenses. \r\nGetting back to the point Mr. Jansen and others have made about \r\nprivacy here, can you tell me what you think the standard \r\nshould be, should there be any national standard, let us say, \r\nabout the use of the database of information beyond law \r\nenforcement and verification of identification? Ms. Serian.\r\n Ms. Serian. There absolutely should be, Senator. Motor \r\nvehicle agencies right now are governed by some of the \r\nstrictest privacy standards anywhere, and that is the Driver \r\nPrivacy Protection Act. We take those very seriously. In fact, \r\nmany States have even more stringent privacy regulations and \r\nlaws than the DPPA requires. We take that very seriously and we \r\ncertainly follow that law.\r\n I do believe that with any new proposal, we should probably \r\nconsider additional amendments or considerations to change the \r\nDriver Privacy Protection Act in terms of strengthening it even \r\nfurther. Even though we have very stringent privacy laws and \r\nregulations and we take those very seriously and we treat that \r\nas a great responsibility, I think there is still a need to \r\neven consider stronger amendments to the Driver Privacy \r\nProtection Act.\r\n For an example, if I may----\r\n Senator Durbin. Sure.\r\n Ms. Serian. An example of taking your license right now and \r\nnot using it for verification procedures--this is a real \r\nPennsylvania license here--and using it in bars or nightclubs, \r\nnot just for verification of age, or in convenience stores for \r\nverification to be able to buy tobacco, taking that information \r\nthat is on there and storing it, even though you might give it \r\nup freely to go into that bar, or even though you might give it \r\nup freely to go to the convenience store or stay in a hotel, I \r\nthink we need to consider greater uses in terms of more \r\nstringent requirements so that it can only be used for \r\nverification purposes and certainly not retaining the data.\r\n Senator Durbin. Mr. Goleman, you also made a reference to \r\nFederal standards when it came to commercial driver's licenses. \r\nWhat are those standards that currently apply when the States \r\nissue these commercial driver's licenses, the Federal \r\nstandards?\r\n Mr. Goleman. There are several standards. There are \r\nstandards for the actual tests that the driver has to take. But \r\nas far as the information system goes, the States issue the \r\nlicenses according to the Federal standards and the States \r\nmaintain that driving record, but once they issue that license, \r\nthey essentially register that driver into the Commercial \r\nDrivers License Information System, which is merely an index of \r\nthe fact that this driver, Joe Smith, with this date of birth \r\nand this driver's license number was issued a license in the \r\nState of Illinois.\r\n If that driver attempts to get a license in any other \r\nState, the State is required to check first to see if he is \r\nalready registered in the system, and if he is, then that \r\nrecord is pulled back into the new State for combining with his \r\nexisting record.\r\n So the States retain the data in their own systems. It is a \r\nvery critical aspect of the system, that they retain ownership \r\nof that data and are responsible for it. Yet there is a \r\ncentralized index that allows them to locate the record \r\nwherever it is.\r\n Senator Durbin. Good. Thank you very much.\r\n I might say that we had a number of witnesses who wanted to \r\njoin us today from a variety of different groups, Mothers \r\nAgainst Drunk Driving and others. Each group kind of came to \r\nthis from a little different angle, but they all started with \r\nthe same premise, that the misuse of driver's licenses had \r\ncaused terrible problems, and I think we have heard about quite \r\na bit of that today.\r\n The identity theft question, which involves not just credit \r\nbut traffic offenses and, in fact, reputation of an individual, \r\nwhich has to be reconstructed, and fortunately, Mr. Wern, you \r\nwere able to do that because of your own skills.\r\n Chief Viverette has talked to us about the law enforcement \r\nside of this. But for a driver's license issued to one of the \r\nwould-be terrorists and used on September 9 to avoid any \r\nfurther investigation, people may be alive today who were \r\nkilled on September 11. It is a matter of that sort of gravity.\r\n We have also heard and probably know from personal \r\nexperience these young people who use these driver's licenses \r\nfor alcohol and tobacco and to hide bad driving records.\r\n The list goes on and on, and I think it really calls on us \r\nto try to come up with a reasonable means of cooperating with \r\nthe State issuing agencies so that we can establish meaningful \r\nstandards so that people know that it is a serious process in \r\nthe issuance of State IDs and driver's licenses so that we can \r\nverify that they are not defeating the system by forum shopping \r\nin different States for the easiest place to find a driver's \r\nlicense, so that we can also find out whether someone has a bad \r\ndriving record in one State and is trying to avoid that \r\nknowledge in another.\r\n It is a way to crack down on fake ID mills and to deter \r\ninternal fraud, and I think Chief Viverette made the point, and \r\nothers, as well, we need to stiffen the penalties. We need to \r\ntake this seriously. If we are going to go through what I \r\nconsider to be the acceptable hassle of producing photo IDs, \r\nlet us make certain that they are accurate from the start.\r\n Thank you all very much for joining us. It was a good panel \r\nand we will proceed in preparation of this legislation.\r\n The Subcommittee meeting will stand adjourned.\r\n [Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]\r\n\r\n A P P E N D I X\r\n\r\n ---------- \r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.001\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.002\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.003\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.004\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.005\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.006\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.007\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.008\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.009\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.010\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.011\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.012\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.013\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.014\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.015\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.016\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 80295.017\r\n\r\n[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] 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[Senate Hearing 107-506] [From the U.S. Government Printing Office] S. Hrg. 107-506 A LICENSE TO BREAK THE LAW? PROTECTING THE INTEGRITY OF DRIVER’S LICENSES ======================================================================= HEARING before the OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, RESTRUCTURING, AND...<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":4181,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[73,57],"tags":[116,118],"class_list":["post-6267","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-hearings-united-states-senate","category-legislation","tag-hearings","tag-legislation"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/p89tuq-1D5","jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/12\/Government-Congress.png","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6267","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6267"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6267\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6268,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6267\/revisions\/6268"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/4181"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6267"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6267"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/multiracial.com\/index.php\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6267"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}